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The aim of this paper is to propose a new framework to assess the impact of Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) jurisprudence on Internal Market-related areas, by considering whether the 
jurisprudence of the Court on corporate taxation fulfils the constitutional mandate, as set-out in the 
European Treaties, of establishing such a market.  It is shown that the Court’s focus upon removing 
discriminatory obstacles to the fundamental freedoms does not necessarily lead to a more level playing 
field and increased tax neutrality, an instrumental objective towards attaining a European Internal Market. 
In order to assess whether the jurisprudence of the Court does indeed attain increased neutrality or level 
playing field, two rulings are used as case studies. The first ruling in Lankhorst-Hohorst regards the 
compatibility of thin capitalisation with free movement provisions; the second in Marks & Spencer 
concerns the compatibility of rules on group consolidation with those same provisions. An economic 
analysis demonstrates that, depending on the reaction of Member States to the ruling, tax induced 
differences in capital costs faced by firms operating within the European Internal Market may increase, 
whilst GDP and welfare may decrease. Consideration of actual legislative amendments introduced to thin 
capitalisation rules by Member States following Lankhorst-Hohorst, and to group consolidation rules 
following Marks & Spencer, appear to indicate that it is this negative scenario which has prevailed. Results 
demonstrate that it is not always or necessarily the case that decisions of the CJEU will led to an increased 
level playing field and tax neutrality, thus contributing to the establishing of the EU Internal Market.  The 
paper considers the constitutional implications of this conclusion, and the consequent breaking of the 
constitutional instrumental chain. In particular, it reflects on whether the Court’s actions can be regarded 
as ultra vires, and whether they may constitute a violation of the rule of law and the principle of separation 
of powers.  It concludes that the Court’s lack of consideration of the constitutional instrumental chain 
might mean that we are heading in the wrong direction. 
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1. Introduction 
The influence of the CJEU over corporate direct tax matters is both significant and far reaching.  
Initiated just over two decades ago, this influence has been progressively increasing and has reached 
such an extent that today there is hardly any area of direct taxation which has not been affected.  The 
Court’s approach to direct tax matters is founded on the mandate attributed to the European 
institutions by the Treaty of Rome and its establishment of a European Internal Market.1
The aim of this paper is to answer that question by adopting an interdisciplinary approach – law and 
economics.  In Part Two consideration is given to what has been designated here as the constitutional 
instrumental chain, as originally set-up by the EEC Treaty.  Particular attention is given to the 
ultimate constitutional aim of establishing a European Internal Market, and to the Court’s option to 
concentrate upon the instrumental removal of discriminatory measures. It is further demonstrated 
how, that throughout its existence to date, this approach has created a methodological misgiving 
whereby the instrument – namely the removal of those measures – has often become confused with 
the over-arching aim itself.  In Part Three attention shifts towards the CJEU and namely to its role 
within direct corporate taxes.  Parts Four and Five focus on the impact of two rulings of the Court as 
case studies.  In Part Four the ruling in Lankhorst-Hohorst regarding the compatibility of thin 
capitalisation with free movement provisions is used; this case study therefore concerns restrictions to 
intra-group loans in the form of thin capitalisation rules.  It starts by providing the legal background, 
then presents an economic model that illustrates the possible economic effects of the ruling, and 
  In the 
absence of harmonising legislation the Court has taken the lead-role as regards corporate tax matters.  
Under the banner of ensuring free movement, it has consistently ruled on the removal of 
discriminatory tax treatment of European companies, or tax measures which impose restrictions upon 
intra-EU trade.  Often neglected, however, is the fact that behind this stated objective there is a 
constitutional mandate to ensure the establishment of an Internal Market: ensuring free movement is 
instrumental to increasing the level playing field and to ensuring neutrality within Europe, which in 
turn is instrumental to achieving a European Internal Market. Yet, whilst much has been written about 
the Court’s jurisprudence on tax matters, and indeed about free movement, little if anything has been 
said about the effects which that jurisprudence has had on the ultimate aim of establishing a European 
Internal Market and the instrumental objectives of ensuring a level playing field and fiscal neutrality.  
The fundamental question that should be asked therefore is whether the CJEU tax jurisprudence does 
indeed lead to an increased level playing field and neutrality, and thus contributes to the establishment 
of such a market. 
                                                 
1 Whilst until the Single European Act (OJ L169, 29/07/1987) the term used within the Treaty was “common 
market”, this term has been progressively substituted since then by the preferred term “internal market”. See 
part 2 below. For the purposes of this paper the term internal market will be used, except where a clear 
distinction between the two terms is necessary. 
 3 
finally considers the actual amendments introduced to thin capitalisation rules by Member States 
following Lankhorst-Hohorst, thereby establishing what are the most likely economic effects of the 
ruling.  A similar approach is adopted as regards the second case study presented.  In Part Five the 
ruling in Marks & Spencer concerning the compatibility of rules on group consolidation with the 
fundamental freedoms is analysed; this case study therefore focus on intra-group offsetting of losses 
in the context of group consolidation regimes.  After providing the legal background, it presents a 
similar economic model that illustrates the possible economic effects of the ruling, and then considers 
the actual amendments introduced to group consolidation rules by Member States following Marks & 
Spencer to establish what are the most likely economic effects of this ruling.  The paper concludes in 
Part Six with economic and legal considerations, including as regards the constitutional implications 
of the results which have been presented. 
 
2. The Constitutional Instrumental Chain: From Economic Growth to Removal of 
Discriminatory Measures 
In April 1951, France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries signed the Treaty of Paris 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community.2 The Community’s aim was to create a 
common market for coal and steel (Articles 1 and 3 ECSC Treaty), placing the production of coal and 
steel under a common High Authority. Soon after, on the initiative of the Belgian Foreign Minister, 
Paul-Henri Spaak, the foreign ministers of the six member states of the ECSC gathered at Messina, in 
Sicily to discuss the possibility of extending the ECSC to a general common market. From the 
Messina Conference a Resolution emerged which established an Intergovernmental Committee under 
Paul-Henri Spaak’s chairmanship;3 this would be responsible for elaborating a proposal for a treaty to 
establish a “common market”. The report from the Intergovernmental Committee, which became 
known as the Spaak Report,4 was presented and accepted by the Foreign Ministers of the Six at the 
Venice conference in May 1956. It called for the creation of a common market, defined as the result 
of the fusion of national markets to create a larger unit of production, thereby stimulating greater 
economic growth.5
                                                 
2 For a more detailed description and analysis of the Schuman Plan and the political environment which led to 
the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community see D. Weigall and P. Stirk, The Origins & 
Development of the European Community (London: Leicester University Press, 1992), at 55–70. 
 In turn, the advantages for economic growth of achieving a level playing field and 
3 Resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community 
at the Messina Conference, 1–2 June 1955, in id. at 94–97, Document 6.1. 
4 Report of the Heads of Delegation to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 21 April 1956, hereafter 
“Spaak Report”.  Some sought to point to the injustice of this name, arguing that the report had, in reality, been 
mainly written by Pierre Uri, a French economist seen as Jean Monnet’s right-hand man who was part of the 
Intergovernmental Committee, see M.J. Dedman, The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945–
95 – A History of European Integration (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), at 99. 
5 The expectation of economic growth was based on economic integration theories, in particular the so-called 
theory of preferences, or customs union theory. For an analysis of these theories in the context of European 
integration see J. Pinder, “Enhancing the Community’s Economic and Political Capacity: Some Consequences 
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neutrality is expressed early in the report as a justification for the implementation of the Internal 
Market: 
“Les protections qui eliminent la concurrence extérieure ont ailleurs pour le progres de la 
production et le relevement du niveau de vie une consequence particulierement nocive: ce sont les 
facilites et l'incitation qu’elles donnent a l’elimination de la concurrence interne. Dans un 
marche plus vaste, il n’est plus possible d'organiser le maintien de modes d’exploitation vieillis 
qui determinent a la fois des prix eleves et des salaires bas; cedes entreprises, au lieu de 
preserver des positions inunobiles, sont soumises a une pression permanente pour investir en vue 
de developper la production, d'ameliorer la qualite et de moderniser l'exploitation: il leur faut 
progresser pour se maintenir. 
Telle est la raison fondamentale pour laquelle, si souhaitable que puisse apparahre en theorie 
une liberation du commerce a echelle mondiale, un veritable marche commun n’est finalement 
realisable qu’entre un groupe limite d’Etats, qu’on souhaitera aussi large que possible.”6
Although, the Report foresaw other strands to the development of the common market, the 
achievement of a customs union and the free movement of commodities and factors of production 
seemed to be key aspects of the proposal; instrumental to the creation of a level playing field and 
increased neutrality, instrumental also to the creation of the common market. 
 
The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) was finally signed by 
France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries in March 1957.  Following the ethos of 
Report closely, the Treaty placed the concept of a common market at the centre of the new 
Community.  As stated in Article 2 of the Treaty, the Community’s principal aim was the 
establishment of a common market, which would be achieved through the elimination of customs 
duties and quantitative restrictions between Member States, the adoption of a common customs tariff, 
the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of factors of production, and the adoption of common 
policies on various areas. The figure below attempts to illustrate what can be designated as the 
constitutional instrumental chain proposed by the Spaak Report and set-up by the EEC Treaty.7
                                                                                                                                                        
of Completing the Common Market”, in R. Bieber et al (eds.), 1992: One European Market? A Critical 
Analysis of the Commission’s Internal Market Strategy (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988), 55; 
and C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU – The Four Freedoms, 3rd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), at 3-9 Notwithstanding this, and despite the high level of expectation, there were dissenting voices 
like that of R. Bertrand, Economic Counselor for the OECD, arguing that the claims of greater economic growth 
made which preceded the signing of the EEC Treaty were unsubstantiated in economic terms, see “The 
European Common Market Proposal” (1956) International Organization X, 559–574, at 573. 
 
6 Spaak Report, at 14. There is no official version of the Report in English language. 
7 Whilst some may still argue that a Treaty is still a Treaty, the first statement that the Treaties had 
constitutional character came early in Les Verts, where the CJEU stated that the Treaty “basic constitutional 
charter”, Case 294/83, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament, [1986] ECR 1339, at para. 23. For 
a recent analysis of the significance of this statement in that ruling, see K. Lenaerts, “The Basic Constitutional 
Charter of a Community Based on the Rule of Law” and N. Walker, “Opening or Closure? The Consttitutional 
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Fig. 1: The Constitutional Instrumental Chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 The ultimate constitutional aim of establishing a European Internal Market 
Whilst references to the establishment of a common market as the ultimate aim of the European 
integration process abounded in the EEC Treaty, it was not always clear what were the boundaries of 
the concept, i.e. for constitutional purposes what actually constituted a common market.  Further 
clarification was provided by the legislation following the approval of the Single European Act (SEA) 
in 1987, opening the door for new jurisprudential and doctrinal developments on this matter. 
Under the SEA, the definition of the term internal market was given centre stage within the European 
integration process.8
                                                                                                                                                        
Intimations of the ECJ” in M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law - The 
Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 295-
315 and 333-342 respectively.  At present, the fact that the European Treaties, and in particular the EC Treaty 
have constitutional status is almost universally accepted, see M. Poiares Maduro, We, the Court – The European 
Court of Justice & the European Economic Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), at 7-12, and 
bibliography cited therein. For a different perspective, characterising the fundamental freedoms as "quasi-
constitutional requirements" and "quasi-constitutional Treaty limits", see J. Englisch, "Tax Coordination 
Between Member States in the EU - Role of the ECJ" in M. Lang (ed.), Horizontal Tax Coordination Within the 
EU and Within States, papers presented at ESF Exploratory Workshop 2010, forthcoming. 
  That same amending Treaty also included provisions which entrusted the 
European institutions with the specific task of adopting measures with a view to establishing an 
internal market.  The Community’s competence as regards the internal market can be inferred from 
8 OJ L169, 29/07/1987.  Whether the terms “common market” and “internal market” are actually synonyms or 
not, however, is a deeply controversial matter. For a comprehensive analysis of the process which preceded the 
approval of the SEA and the introduction of the term “internal market”, as well as the dynamic interaction 
between the two terms, see R. de la Feria, The EU VAT System and the Internal Market (Amsterdam: IBFD, 
2009), at 3-6 and 29 et seq. 
Economic growth / Welfare 
Internal Market 
Level playing field / Neutrality 
Non-discrimination / Harmonisation 
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what were until recently Articles 3(1)(c),9 and 14(1) of the European Community Treaty (EC 
Treaty),10 and are now Articles 2(1) and (6),11 and 26(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), respectively.12
The impact of these provisions in the European legal system – and more generally of setting the 
Internal Market centre stage – is reflected in the contents and scope of the constitutional mandate 
which they imposed.
  Further details were set out in what was Article 95 of the 
EC Treaty, and is at present Article 114 of the TFEU, a residual provision which confers upon the 
Union the competence to approve legislative measures with a view to “the establishment and the 
functioning of the internal market”. 
13
As regards the first point, namely the question over the legal effect of these provisions, and in 
particular Article 26 TFEU [ex Article 14 EC Treaty], this has been the subject of intense controversy 
since its introduction by the SEA. The fundamental query here is whether, rather than conferring 
competenceon the Union as regards the internal market, that Article actually imposes an obligation 
upon the Union to approve legislation with a view to establishing or improving the functioning of the 
internal market. The compulsory nature of the old Article 14(1) has been denied by some 
commentators, their central argument being that the provision sets out a mere political aim that is not 
  The existence and characteristics of this mandate must be assessed through 
consideration of two preliminary points: the legal effect of these provisions, in particular Article 26(1) 
of the TFEU, which will determine the existence and nature of a constitutional mandate; and the legal 
definition of Internal Market, as set out in the same article, which will determine the contents of that 
mandate. 
                                                 
9 This Article read: “1. For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as 
provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein: […] (c) an internal market 
characterised by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital”. The expression “an internal market characterised by”, and the reference to “goods” were 
only included in this provision by the Treaty on the European Union. Prior to that Treaty, Article 3(1)(c) of the 
EEC Treaty only made reference to “the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of 
movement for persons, services and capital”. 
10 This read as follows: “The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the 
internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992, in accordance with the provisions of this Article 
and of Articles 15, 26, 47(2), 49, 80, 93 and 95 and without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty”. 
11 These paragraphs read: “1. The Union shall establish an internal market. […] 6. The Union shall pursue its 
objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it in the 
Treaties”, OJ C83, 30/03/2010, p. 0047-0200.  Article 3(1)(c) as it stood was repealed by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
12 This provision reads currently as follows: “1. The Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing 
and ensuring the functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions in the Treaties”. 
References to specific Articles were therefore removed by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
13  Although the prevalence of economic aims in the Treaties has been increasingly challenged in recent times, 
see recently C. Semmelmann, ‘The European Union’s Economic Constitution under the Lisbon Treaty: soul-
searching shifts the focus to procedure’ (2010) European Law Review 35(4), 516-541, arguing that market goals 
and social-policy goals enjoy equal status with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.  See also A.J. 
Menéndez, “European Citizenship after Martínez Sala and Baumbast: Has European Law Become More Human 
but Less Social?” in M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), n. 7 above, 363-393. 
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capable of creating legal effects.14 This was also the view adopted by several Member States in the 
famous Wijsenbeek case.15 Notwithstanding this, most authors have defended that Article 26 does 
indeed impose an obligation upon the Union to act.16 Whilst the Court has not ruled directly on the 
matter, this interpretation has been confirmed by Advocate General Cosmas in Wijsenbeek.17
Within the Treaty, internal market is defined in paragraph two of Article 26 as “an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaties”.  This definition has remained unchanged since its 
introduction in the EEC Treaty by the SEA.
  There is 
therefore a constitutional mandate, characterised by a compulsory nature, that was bestowed upon the 
Union to establish a European Internal Market.  Acting upon this obligation, however, presupposes an 
understanding of what the internal market actually is – and this is far from fully clear. 
18  Yet, despite this definitional consistency, and as the 
Commission itself has implicitly acknowledged, its interpretation is far from clear.19  The definition 
has a dual component: first, “an area without internal frontiers”; and second, “in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured”.20
                                                 
14 See C. Gulmann, “The Single European Act – Some Remarks from a Danish Perspective” (1987) Common 
Market Law Review 24, 31-40. 
 
15 Case C-378/97, [1999] ECR I-6207. The Governments of Spain, Netherlands, Ireland, and United Kingdom 
all defended the political nature of Article 14 [now Article 26 TFEU], see Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas 
at paragraph 37. 
16 See H.G. Schermers, “The effect of the date 31 December 1992” (1991) Common Market Law Review 28, 
275–289, at 278; P. Craig, “The Evolution of the Single Market”, in C. Barnard and J. Scott (eds.), The Law of 
the Single European Market – Unpacking the Premises (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2002), 
at 16; and F. Schockweiler, “Les consequences de l’expiration du delai imparti pour l’etablissement du marche 
interieur” (1991) Revue du Marche Commun et de l’Union Europeenne 353, 882-886, at 884-885. 
17 According to the Advocate General “the Article in question [Article 26] has a compulsory content. It created 
an obligation on the Community to progressively establish an internal market, with a view to creating a ‘space 
without internal frontiers’” (authors’ translation from the Spanish version of the Advocate General’s Opinion). 
18 Several amendments were suggested during the discussions held by the European Convention for the 
European Constitution, most of which maintained the essence of the definition but added other elements to it, 
such as reference to approximation of laws and free competition. See the suggestions put forward by an 
independent group of lawyers at Cambridge University, so-called “Cambridge Text”, released as European 
Convention, Contribution by Mr. P. Hain, member of the Convention – Constitutional Treaty of the European 
union, CONV 345/1/02, 16 October 2002; the suggestions of a Franco-German research working group, known 
as “Freiburg Draft”, released as European Convention, Contribution submitted by Mr. Erwin Teufel, member of 
the Convention: “Freiburg Draft of a European Constitutional Treaty”, CONV 495/03, 20 January 2003; and 
the contribution of Mr. Elmar Brok, member of the European Convention, released as European Convention, 
Contribution by Mr. Elmar Brok, member of the Convention: “The Constitution of the European Union”, 
CONV 325/2/02, 7 March 2003. Ultimately, however, Article III-130(2) TCE only included a minor change to 
the current text: the substitution of expression “this Treaty” by “the Constitution”, OJ C310, 16/12/2004; and the 
same approach was adopted by the Treaty of Lisbon with the substitution of expression “this Treaty” by “the 
Treaties”. 
19 See A.A.M. Schrauwen, Marche Interieur – Recherches sur une notion, Doctorate Thesis, University of 
Amsterdam, 1997, at 138. Equally, G. de Búrca comments that “internal market” is one example of “terms 
which are highly significant within the EU legal and political context, but which remain nonetheless or even 
deliberately uncertain in scope and meaning”, in “Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Significance After Amsterdam”, 
Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper Series, WP 7/99, at 9. 
20 Some add a third part to this formulation: “in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty”, see A.A.M. 
Schrauwen, id. at 144-145. However, even if regarded as a separate part of the definition, this sentence is of 
considerably less importance, as accepted by the author herself. 
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The expression “an area without internal frontiers” has been subject of intense controversy.  Severely 
criticised by some,21 regarded as the “key part of the definition” by others,22 its origins seem to be 
rooted in the Commission’s Internal Market Programme,23 which revolved around the idea of 
“abolition of frontiers”, divided into physical, technical, or fiscal frontiers.  The Intergovernmental 
Conference’s discussions seem to confirm this assumption, to the extent that the expression was 
included in the SEA on the basis of the Commission’s proposals.24  It has been suggested that the 
expression was put forward by the Commission in order to include within the scope of the internal 
market other aspects, which might not be covered by the Treaty provisions relating to free movement, 
in particular as regards free movement of persons.25 This would seem to indicate that the scope of “an 
area without internal frontiers” is broader than that of free movement. If this was in fact the 
Commission’s intention, the tactic might have worked slightly too well: the expression is potentially 
so broad that both most commentators and the Court alike, have tended to concentrate on the other 
aspect of the definition of internal market: the fundamental freedoms.26 One of the most significant 
exceptions to this tendency has been the Court’s ruling in Rundfunk and Others, were it stated that the 
recourse to Article 95 EC Treaty [now Article 114 TFEU] as a legal basis for Community legislation 
did not presuppose the existence of an actual link with free movement.27
The separate reference to the freedoms in Article 26 TFEU too has been the target of criticisms. It has 
been argued that the separate reference to the free movement without mention of fair competition and 
unity of market constituted an “artificial separation”, which could but create “practical, political, and 
legal problems”.
 Implicitly, therefore, the 
Court is acknowledging that there is more to the “establishment and the functioning of the internal 
market” than just free movement. 
28
                                                 
21 See Pescatore, who comments “what does Article 8A mean when it speaks of ‘an area without internal 
frontiers’? What are frontiers in this context?” in “Some critical remarks on the ‘Single European Act” (1987) 
Common Market Law Review 24, 9-18, at 16. 
  Thus, some conclude that the reference to free movement is merely informative 
22 See C.D. Ehlermann, “The Internal Market following the Single European Act” (1987) Common Market Law 
Review 24, 361-409, at 364. 
23 Completing the Internal Market – White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85) 310, 
14 June 1985. 
24 However, the formula suggested by the Commission was slightly different: it referred to “an area without 
internal frontiers … under conditions identical to those obtaining within a Member State”, see C.D. Ehlermann, 
n. 22 above, at Annex III and 408. The final sentence was ultimately omitted and substituted by “in accordance 
with the provisions of this Treaty”. 
25 See C.D. Ehlermann, n. 22 above, at 366. 
26 See A.A.M. Schrauwen who comments “les horizons de l’espace sans frontiers etant larges, ses limites 
devront venir des autres carateristiques essentielles”, in n. 19 above, at 142. 
27 Joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01, and C-139/01, [2003] ECR I-12971. For an analysis of this case in the 
context of the Union’s internal market competence, see D. Wyatt, “Community Competence to Regulate the 
Internal Market”, University of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
9/2007, July 2007, at 36-40. 
28 See P. Verloren van Themaat, former Advocate General at the CJ, in “The Contributions to the Establishment 
of the Internal Market by the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities”, in R. Bieber et al 
(eds.), 1992: One European Market? A Critical Analysis of the Commission’s Internal Market Strategy (Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988), at 115. 
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and does not merit the qualification as legal definition.29
The CJEU case law as regards the Community’s legislative competence on internal market matters 
has provided further guidance as regards its concept.  In Titanium Dioxide the Court stated that “in 
order to give effect to the fundamental freedoms in [Article 26 TFEU], harmonising measures are 
necessary to deal with disparities between the laws of the Member States in areas where such 
disparities are liable to create or maintain distorted conditions of competition”.
  Once again, as with the expression “an area 
without internal frontiers”, the main difficulty seems to be the lack of precision, i.e. when can it be 
said that goods, persons, services, and capital move freely within the Community? 
30  The Court’s ruling 
in Titanium Dioxide, and in particular the adoption of such a wide interpretation of the concept of the 
internal market, gave rise to intense controversy at the time of its release.31  It was said at the time that 
it endangered the rule of law,32 and that it constituted a clear sign of the decline of the principal of 
conferral of powers.33  A few years later, in Tobacco Advertising, the Court attempted to put those 
fears at rest by establishing some boundaries to the internal market concept, albeit keeping the 
elimination of distortions of competition within its scope.34
It ruled in that case that measures referred to in Article 114 TFEU [ex Article 95 EC Treaty] must be 
intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and the functioning of the internal market, 
and that the Article did not vest in the Union a general power to regulate the internal market.
 
35  
Implicit in this judgment, therefore, was a distinction between measures intended to improve 
conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market, on the one hand; and 
measures intended to regulate the internal market, on the other hand.  The Union’s competence under 
the old Article 95 was limited to the first aspect.36  Moreover, according to the Court “the mere 
finding of disparities between national rules and of finding abstract risk of obstacles to the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms or of distortion of competition” was insufficient to justify the choice of Article 
95 as a legal basis.37
                                                 
29 See comments by P. Pescatore noted in A.A.M. Schrauwen, n. 19 above, at 142-143. 
  On the specific aspect of distortion of competition, the Court limited the 
30 Case C-300/89, Commission v Council, [1991] ECR I-2867, at paragraph 15. 
31 Although the reference to elimination of distortions to competition as part of the concept of internal market 
was not original, see J. Usher, “Case C-376/98, Germany v European Parliament and Council (tobacco 
advertising). Judgment of the Full Court of 5 October 2000, [2000] ECR I-8419” (2001) Common Market Law 
Review 38, 1519-1543, at 1527 et seq. 
32 See S. Crosby, “The Single Market and the Rule of Law” (1991) European Law Review 16, 451– 465. 
33 See R. Barents, “The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations on the Legal Basis of Community 
Legislation” (1993) Common Market Law Review 30, 85–109; although the author’s comments seem to come as 
praise, rather than criticisms, for the Court’s ruling. 
34 Case C-376/98, [2000] ECR I-8419. 
35 Id at paragraphs 83 of the judgment. 
36 The same rationale should apply mutatis mutandis to Article 113, as well as to all other Treaty provisions, 
which refer to adoption of measures with a view to “the establishment and functioning of the internal market”. 
37 Case C-376/98, [2000] ECR I-8419, paragraph 84 of the judgment. D. Wyatt argues that in order for the 
measure to fall within the scope of Article 95 obstacles must be “actual or potential, direct or indirect (but not, it 
seems, if the effect is too remote and indirect to hinder trade)”, in “Constitutional Significance of the Tobacco 
Advertising Judgment of the European Court of Justice”, CELS Occasional Paper 5, July 2001, 19-31, at 23. 
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interpretation adopted in Titanium Dioxide by ruling that only where the distortion is “appreciable” 
can a measure be adopted on the basis of Article 95 as “in the absence of such a requirement, the 
powers of the Community legislature would be practically unlimited”.38  Advocate General Fennelly 
had further suggested in his Opinion that in order to determine whether a Community measure 
pursues internal market objectives, a two-part test should be fulfilled: first, it must be ascertained 
whether the “preconditions for harmonisation exist”, i.e. disparate national rules which either 
constitute barriers to the exercise of the four freedoms or distort conditions of competition in an 
economic sector; and second, the action taken by the Community must either intend to eliminate those 
barriers or intend to eliminate the distortions of competition.39  Although not explicitly referring to it 
the Court essentially follows this test with some important qualifications, namely to the first 
requirement: the existing obstacles to the four freedoms must be concrete and existing distortions of 
competition must be both concrete and appreciable.40
In Tobacco Advertising these criteria were scattered throughout the judgment – and the Opinion – in a 
relatively unsystematic fashion, but the Court has moved towards a more consistently expressed 
formula in the very recent judgment in Vodafone.
 
41  Yet, many felt that the Tobacco Advertising 
formula has left key questions unanswered, namely what is the scope of harmonisation envisaged by 
the EC Treaty, or how much harmonisation is constitutionally required?42
Whilst answers to these questions are far from obvious, what is clear is that, the ideas of increasing 
neutrality and establishing a level playing field within Europe are implicit in the elimination of 
concrete obstacles to free movement and the elimination of concrete and appreciable distortions of 
competition, either through jurisprudential removal of national measures or through harmonisation.  
In this context, these objectives can be seen as instrumental to the objective of attaining increased 
neutrality and a level playing field; in the same manner that increased neutrality and a level playing 
field should be seen as instrumental to the ultimate constitutional objective of establishing a European 
Internal Market.  From a pure legal perspective, the existence of this instrumental chain might not be 
  In other words, how far 
does the constitutional mandate go? 
                                                 
38 Case C-376/98, [2000] ECR I-8419, paragraphs 106 and 107 of the judgment; see also paragraphs 89 and 90 
of the Advocate General’s Opinion. 
39 Id at paragraph 93 of Advocate General’s Opinion. 
40 The use of the expression “distortion of competition” in this ruling has been the target of criticism, namely 
that it does not “adequately capture the normative concern that the Court of Justice is plausibly trying to 
address”, see M. Kumm, “Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union” (2006) European Law Journal 12(4), 503–533, at 505 and 508-515. 
41 Case C-58/08, Vodafone, O2 et al v. Secretary of State, Judgment of 8 June 2010, nyr, paras. 32-33. See S. 
Weatherill, “The limits of legislative harmonisation ten years after Tobacco Advertising: how the Court’s case 
law has become a ‘drafting guide’” (2011) German Law Journal 12, 827. 
42 See S. Weatherill, “Supply of and demand for internal market regulation: strategies, preferences and 
interpretation”, in N. Nic Shuibhne (ed.), Regulating the Internal Market (Cheltenham and Northampton: 
Edward Elgar, 2006), 29–56, at 29–38. The concept of harmonisation is itself unclear, see for an analysis P.J. 
Slot, “Harmonisation” (1996) European Law Review 21, 378–397; M. Dougan, “Minimum Harmonisation and 
the Internal Market” (2000) Common Market Law Review 37, 853-885; and D. Vignes, “The Harmonisation of 
National Legislation and the EEC” (1990) European Law Review 15, 358–374. 
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terribly helpful: neutrality or a level playing field might be as difficult to define as concrete obstacles 
to free movement and concrete and appreciable distortions to competition.  However, not only do 
these concepts have a specific significance in economic terms but they can also be quantified through 
economic analysis.  Thus – considering that as has been highlighted above,43
2.2 The methodology: centralised and decentralised models 
 it is precisely this 
economic perspective that underlines the constitutional mandate for the establishment of an Internal 
Market – it is only reasonable to resort to such analysis as the appropriate method of assessing 
whether the elimination of obstacles to the freedoms or distortions of competition is indeed increasing 
neutrality and creating a level playing field, and consequently fulfilling the constitutional mandate 
that they are meant to address – namely establishing a European Internal Market. 
Having established both the existence and the centrality of a constitutional mandate for the European 
Internal Market, the question which arises from a practical perspective is: what is the constitutional 
method for attaining this ultimate aim?  In principle, three ideal constitutional models are possible 
within the European Economic Constitution: a centralised constitutional model; a competitive 
constitutional model; and a decentralised constitutional model.  The centralised model favours a 
process of market regulation by the replacement of national laws with EU legislation.  The basic 
principle behind this is that Member States’ domestic legislation is incompatible with the aims of an 
Internal Market and should therefore be replaced by harmonised EU legislation.  The competitive 
model promotes competition between legal orders, namely through the principle of mutual 
recognition.  The basic idea here is that market forces will work to create an integrated and more 
efficient market.  In the decentralised model, Member States will retain regulatory powers, but are 
prevented from developing protectionist policies.  Discriminatory and/or restrictive measures will be 
struck-down, namely by the Court.44
In practice, however, these constitutional models are not applied separately in their pure form within 
the Treaties; instead there is an interaction, a continuous interplay between them in different policy 
areas.  Leaving aside the competitive model, which relies primarily on the inaction of the European 
institutions,
 
45
By substituting different national legislation with a single set of rules, harmonisation under the 
centralised model has many advantages, when compared to the decentralised model, even considering 
 actions by the various institutions operate within both the centralised and decentralised 
models, either pursuing harmonising legislation or striking-down national discriminatory and/or 
restrictive measures, depending on legal, or perhaps more frequently, political constraints. 
                                                 
43 See point 2 above. 
44 See M. Poiares Maduro, n. 7 above, at 108–149. 
45 Although its increase relevance has been strongly defended, see N. Reich, “Competition between Legal 
Orders: A New Paradigm of EC Law?” (1992) Common Market Law Review 29, 861–896. 
 12 
the current trend towards flexibility and differentiation.46  In particular it is a more effective way of 
ensuring that barriers to free movement and distortions of competition are indeed removed: it 
guarantees a higher level of compliance from Member States than intervention by the CJEU under the 
decentralised model; it ensures that the measures put in place by domestic legislators are uniform and 
in line with the objective of removing barriers and distortions within the European market; and it 
increases legal certainty for operators, thus diminishing costs and ensuring better allocation of 
resources.47
Historically, it was precisely this lack of legislative progress that led the Court to adopt the central 
role in enforcing the decentralised model, striking-down national measures that discriminate or restrict 
the fundamental freedoms.  The process started in the late 1960s, with the establishment that Article 
25 EC Treaty [now Article 28 TFEU], regarding free movement of goods, had direct effect and could 
thus be enforced before national courts.
  Yet, harmonisation is often unattainable.  Legal constraints may apply, such as the 
respect for subsidiarity or proportionality, but more importantly there are frequent political 
constraints. In some sensitive areas Member States are less than willing to transfer sovereignty and 
even when the legislative process is initiated, sufficient political consensus to see legislation approved 
might prove impossible to reach. 
48
                                                 
46 These can be understood at macro and micro levels, see G. de Búrca “Differentiation within the Core: The 
Case of the Common Market”, in G. de Búrca and J. Scott (eds.), Constitutional Change in the EU – From 
Uniformity to Flexibility? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 133–171. 
  Since then the Court has developed a massive body of case 
law regarding the incompatibility of national measures with the freedoms’ provisions, on a variety of 
different topics.  The methods that the Court has developed over the last fifty years essentially follow 
two approaches: the removal of discriminatory measures (discrimination approach); and, more 
recently, of the removal of restrictive measures (restriction approach).  The discrimination approach – 
developed first by the Court – seeks to remove measures which directly or indirectly discriminate on 
grounds of nationality (or residence).  Under this approach Member States remain free to regulate 
within their borders, on the condition that their regulation applies equally to home and host State 
goods and persons.  The restriction or market access approach was developed by the Court more 
recently, and seeks to remove measures likely to hinder or create an obstacle to the exercise of a 
freedom.  This approach will apply irrespectively of whether the measures actually discriminate 
against imports or non-residents, so its scope is much wider than that of non-discrimination.  The 
advantage of this approach is that it might be more suited to attaining the ultimate aim of establishing 
47 What has been designated somewhere else as “the shortcomings of jurisprudential developments vs. 
legislative measures”, see R. de la Feria, n. 8 above, at 278 et seq. 
48 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 1.  The case famously established for the first time the principle 
of direct effect, thus becoming one of the most important rulings in European integration history. For a recent 
perspective on its significance see M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), n. 7 above, Part I, Chapters 1 to 4. 
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an internal market; the disadvantage is that it encroaches more strongly upon the regulatory autonomy 
of Member States.49
Notwithstanding some nuances given the particularly sensitivity of the area, the rationale that has 
guided the Court’s into adopting the above method as regards application of the fundamental 
freedoms’ provisions over the last four decades to various policy areas, mirrors broadly the one which 
it has also taken as regards corporate tax matters. 
 
 
3. The Role of the Court of Justice in Direct Taxation 
As opposed to indirect taxation, EU legislation on direct taxation is very sparse.50  At present there are 
six EU legislative instruments on direct taxes – which are of rather limited scope – dealing with either 
specific problems arising from cross-border transactions, or forms of cooperation between Member 
States’ tax authorities.51 This limited scope of application, as well as their somewhat limited aims 
have even led to questions over the extent to which these legislative instruments can be classified as 
truly harmonising legislation.52  This lack of secondary EU direct tax (harmonising) legislation can be 
attributed to various factors. Although harmonisation of corporate tax law as a necessary step towards 
the establishment of a European Internal Market was debated as early as 1962,53
                                                 
49 The bibliography documenting and commenting upon this process is too long to list here. See generally C. 
Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU – The Four Freedoms, 3rd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010); and D. Doukas, “Untying the Market Access Knot: Advertising Restrictions and the Free Movement of 
Goods and Services” (2006-2007) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 9, 177-215. 
 no legal basis was 
ever introduced within the Treaties for that purpose.  The very limited EU direct tax legislation that 
does exist has therefore been proposed and approved on the basis of Article 115 TFEU [ex Article 94 
50 For a compilation of all EU legislation ever approved within indirect taxation, namely VAT, see R. de la 
Feria, A Handbook of EU VAT Legislation, Volumes 1, 2 and 3, Loose-leaf updated bi-annually (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2004-). 
51 They are as follows: Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of Taxation 
Applicable to Mergers, Divisions, Transfers of Assets and Exchanges of Shares concerning Companies of 
Different Member States, OJ L225, 20/8/1990, p. 1-5, known as the “Merger Directive”; Directive 90/435/EEC 
of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of Taxation Applicable in the Case of Parent Companies and 
Subsidiaries in Different Member States, OJ L16, 18/01/1997, p. 98–98, known as the “Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive”; Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest 
Payments, OJ L157, 26/06/2003, p. 38-48, known as the “Savings Directive”; Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 
3 June 2003 on a Common System of Taxation Applicable to Interest and Royalty Payments Made Between 
Associated Companies of Different Member States, OJ L 157, 26/06/2003, p. 49-54, known as the “Interest-
Royalties Directive”; Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 March 1976 on Mutual Assistance for the Recovery 
of Claims Resulting from Operations Forming Part of the System of Financing the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund and of Agricultural Levies and Customs Duties and in Respect of Value Added 
Tax and Certain Excise Duties, known as the “Mutual Assistance Directive for the recovery of taxes”, OJ L 306, 
30/11/1977, p. 34-34; and Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 Concerning Mutual Assistance 
by the Competent Authorities of the Member States in the Field of Direct Taxation, OJ L336, 27/12/1977, p. 15-
20, known as “Mutual Assistance Directive for the exchange of information”. 
52 See M. Aujean, “Tax Policy in the EU: Between Harmonisation and Coordination” (2010) Transfer: 
European Review of Labour and Research 16(1), 11-22. 
53 See The EEC Reports on Tax Harmonisation – The Report of the Fiscal and Financial Committee and the 
Report of the Sub-Groups A, B and C (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 1963), known as the “Neumark Report”. 
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EC Treaty], which together with Article 114 TFEU [ex Article 95 EC Treaty] constitute the fall-back, 
residual, legal basis for approval of all legislation deemed necessary for the establishment and the 
functioning of the internal market. As opposed to Article 114, however, Article 115 requires 
unanimity voting.  Whilst other reasons have been put forward to explain the lack of progress as 
regards harmonisation of direct corporate taxes, it is arguably the lack of specific legal basis for 
harmonisation and the need for unanimity voting which remain the most significant reasons for the 
sparse legislation in this area.54
Approving harmonising legislation within direct taxation still remains on the European policy agenda, 
with the ongoing discussions over the introduction of a common consolidated corporate tax base 
(CCCTB) constituting an archetypical example.
 
55  However, the well-known difficulties in approving 
direct tax legislation at EU level – and with qualified majority voting in this area remaining a distant 
dream –56 created the space for other methods of perceived European integration to be pursued.  Many 
have advocated coordination, rather than harmonisation, as a method of eliminating the existing tax 
obstacles to the establishment and the proper functioning of the internal market.57
                                                 
54 For additional reasons see M. Aujean, n. 52 above and C. Panayi, “European Tax Law: Legislation and 
Political Initiatives” in S. Fleet and G. Brown (eds.), Gore-Brown on EU Company Law (Jordan Publishing), 
Loose-leaf, Chapter 18, at 18-1. 
  In the last decade, 
the European Commission itself seems to have been favouring the soft law approach as a second best 
55 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 16 March 2011. Even before the proposals were out, much had been written 
about this topic over the last three years. For a legal perspective on the various aspects of a CCCTB, see in 
particular M. Lang et al, Common Consolidated Tax Base (Vienna: Linde, 2008) and W. Schoen et al, A 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for Europe (Springer, 2008).  For an economic analysis of the 
consequences of a CCCBT, see L. Bettendorf et al, “Corporate tax consolidation and enhanced cooperation in 
the European Union” (2010) Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper Series, WP 10/01; 
L. Bettendorf et al, “Corporate tax harmonization in the EU” (2009) Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation Working Paper Series, WP 09/32; C. Fuest, “The European Commission’s Proposal for a Common 
Consolidated Tax Base” (2008) Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper Series, WP 
08/23; M. Devereux and S. Loretz, “Increased efficiency through consolidation and formula apportionment in 
the European Union? (2008) Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper Series, WP 08/12; 
M. Devereux and S. Loretz, The Effects of EU Formula Apportionment on Corporate Tax Revenues (2008) 
Fiscal Studies 29(1), 1-33; and C. Spengel and C. Wendt, “A Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for 
multinational companies in the European Union: some issues and options” (2007) Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation Working Paper Series, WP 07/17. 
56 At the Intergovernmental Conference which preceded the European Constitution in 2003 the European 
Commission proposed to extend qualified majority voting to special situations. Reportedly, however, none of 
these were acceptable to Member States, although some Member States pushed for majority voting specifically 
as regards free movement of capital when there is a serious risk of fraud, see M. Aujean, n. 52 above. 
57 See M. Aujean, n. 52 above.  On the use of soft law within the tax area, see H. Gribnau, “Improving the 
Legitimacy of Soft Law in EU Tax Law” (2007) Intertax 1, 30-44; and H.M. van Arendonk, “Fifty Years of 
European Co-operation and the Tax Policy of the European Commission” in L. Hinnekens and P. Hinnekens 
(eds.), A vision of taxes within and outside European borders. Festschrift in honor of Prof. Dr. F. Vanistendael 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2008), 1.  The phenomenon is not exclusive to the tax area, with the 
usage of soft law exploding since 2000.  For an analysis of the role of soft law within European integration more 
generally, see L. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004); and D. 
Trubek, P. Cottrell and M. Nance, “’Soft Law’, ‘Hard Law’ and European integration: toward a theory of 
hybridity” (2005) Jean Monnet Working Paper 02/05. 
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solution.58  Like in other (sensitive) areas, however, it has been the Court that has primarily filled the 
gap on direct tax through extensive case law.59
3.1 Applying the non-discrimination instrument to direct taxation 
 
Whilst the process of striking-down national measures which violate the fundamental freedoms 
started over two decades earlier, its extension to national tax measures is a relatively new 
phenomenon.60  The CJEU ruling in Avoir Fiscal in 1986 might have appeared at the time to be a 
natural progression,61 but its impact can be likened to the opening of Pandora’s Box.62  Similar to 
other areas, the space left empty by the lack of secondary harmonising legislation within corporate tax 
matters has meant that over the last twenty-five years, case law has gained both momentum and 
significance.63  Under the often repeated mantra that “although direct taxation is a matter for the 
Member States, they must nevertheless exercise their direct taxation powers consistently with 
Community law”,64
                                                 
58 This approach can be said to have come to the fore in 2001 with the publication of Tax Policy in the European 
Union – Priorities for the years ahead, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, COM(2001) 260 final, 23 May 2001.  Since then the 
Commission has published several communications highlighting the same shift from hard law to soft law, see P. 
Wattel and B. Terra, European Tax Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2008), at 163-169. For a recent 
evaluation of the importance of soft law in direct taxation, see also H. Gribnau, “The Code of Conduct for 
Business Taxation: An Evaluation of an EU Soft-Law Instrument” and P. Pistone, “Soft Tax Law: Steering 
Legal Pluralism towards International Tax Coordination”, both in D. Weber (ed.), Traditional and Alternative 
Routes to European Tax Integration (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2010), 67-96 and 97-116, respectively. 
 the CJEU has become the principal source of European corporate tax policy. 
59 In a recent study P. Grenschel and M. Jachtenfuchs show, through analysis of a comprehensive data set to 
include all EU tax jurisprudence between 1998 and 2007, that tax policy choices are increasingly constrained by 
EU institutions, and that it is often the EU which determines the shape and even the level of taxation within 
Member States, see “The Fiscal Anatomy of a Regulatory Polity: Tax Policy and Multilevel Governance in the 
EU” (2009) Hertie School of Governance Working Paper 43, October 2009.  
60 For an analysis of the causes for the slow jurisprudential development in this area see F.C. de Hosson, “On the 
controversial role of the European Court in corporate tax cases” (2006) Intertax 34(6/7), 294-304, at 298 et seq. 
61 As F.C. de Hosson states, in some Member States legal commentators immediately assumed – as far back as 
1960 – that the EC Treaty would have consequences for the manner in which Member States could impose 
direct taxes, see n. 60 above, at 297.  On the contrary, Member States had being arguing that absent specific 
Treaty provisions concerning direct taxes, they had exclusive power in this area and primary EU law did not 
apply – the so-called “strict sovereignty exception”, see S. van Thiel, Free Movement of Persons and Income 
Tax Law: the European Court in Search of Principles (IBFD, 2002), at 21 et seq; and M. Isenbaert, EC Law and 
the Sovereignty of the Member States in Direct Taxation  (IBFD, 2010), at 193 et seq. 
62 See Case 270/83, [1986] ECR 273. As recently stated by F. Vanistendael “by submitting his opinion in the 
case Commission v France on October 15th 1985, advocate-general Mancini very probably did no imagine what 
kind of revolution he had unleashed in the tax systems of the Member States” in “Introduction”, in F. 
Vanistendael (ed.), EU Freedoms and Taxation (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006), xxv-xxvi. 
63 At present tax cases reportedly constitute approximately 10% of all cases decided by the CJEU, see R. Mason, 
“Made in America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test” (2008) Boston College Law Review 49, 
1277, at 1281. However, the majority of these – close to 7% – concerns indirect taxation, particularly VAT, 
rather than direct taxation, see R. de la Feria, n. 8 above, at 259-261.  For a data set providing exact numbers 
divided by topic see also P. Grenschel and M. Jachtenfuchs, n. 59 above. 
64 Case C-264/96, ICI, [1997] ECR I-4695, at paragraph 19.  See also amongst others: C-279/93, Schumaker, 
[1995] ECR I-225, paragraph 21; C-80/94, Wielockx, [1995] ECR I-2493, paragraph 16; C-311/97, Royal Bank 
of Scotland, [1999] ECR I-2651, paragraph 19; C-251/98, Baars, [2000] ECR I-2787, paragraph 17; C-324/00, 
Lankhorst-Hohorst, [2002] ECR I-11779; and C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, [2005] ECR I-10837, paragraph 29. 
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Applying the familiar discrimination and restriction approaches,65 it has since then consistently 
intervened to strike down corporate tax measures deemed to be obstacles to the fundamental 
freedoms.66 This role has resulted in the Court’s jurisprudence as regards direct taxation being 
commonly designated as “negative harmonisation”,67 a classification which lacks accuracy somewhat, 
insofar as harmonisation and the removal of national discriminatory and/ or restrictive measures are in 
essence different constitutional methodologies for attaining the Internal Market aim.68
Away from terminological considerations, however, and whilst certainly progressive,
 
69 the adoption 
of such a role by the Court can hardly be said to have been a smooth progression.  A parallel 
development was a growing and persistent criticism to the Court approach as regards direct taxation 
cases.  This criticism ranges from the very specific – concentrating on particular decisions and on 
specific cases – to a general disproval of the Court’s fundamental decision of applying its traditional 
free movement jurisprudence to direct tax matters.70  The basis for this criticism tends to be: the 
Court’s lack of sovereignty or the Court’s threat to national tax sovereignty;71 its lack of awareness of 
the particularities of tax law when making its decisions;72 its lack of concern for the potential 
budgetary implications of its decisions;73
                                                 
65 Although these approaches have not only evolved over time but arguably depend on the subject matter. For a 
comprehensive analysis of the concepts and their evolution as applied to the tax area, see A. Cordewener, “The 
Prohibitions of Discrimination and Restriction within the Framework of the Fully Integrated Internal Market” 
and M. Gammie, “The Compatibility of national tax principles with the single market” in F. Vanistendael (ed.), 
EU Freedoms and Taxation (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006), 1-46 and 105-165, respectively; and P. Pistone, The 
Impact of Community Law on Tax Treaties. Issues and Solutions (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
 or controvertibly its under-zealousness when applying the 
66 The jurisprudence of the Court on corporate taxation is of course not limited to the application and 
interpretation of the freedoms – some cases in particular concern the application and interpretation of secondary 
tax legislation, see generally see P. Wattel and B. Terra, n. 58 above, Chapters 9, 10, 13 and 14.  However, the 
overwhelming majority of cases decided by the Court in this field are of the first type. 
67 See generally P. Wattel and B. Terra, n. 58 above, where the chapters are divided in “positive harmonisation”, 
dedicated to secondary harmonising legislation, and “negative harmonisation”, dedicated to the case-law of the 
CJEU; and A.J. Martín Jiménez, Towards Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Community: An 
Institutional and Procedural Analysis (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999). 
68 See point 2.2 above.  Although it is note worthy that the use of this or other equivalent terms is not exclusive 
to taxation matters; commenting on the wider role of the Court, M. Poiares Maduro has characterised it, for 
example, as “judicial harmonisation”, see n. 7 above, at 68. 
69 Not only have the number of decided cases been growing annually, but also the number of areas of direct 
taxation under scrutiny, see J. Malherbe et al, The Impact of the Rulings of the European Court of Justice in the 
Area of Direct Taxation, Study commissioned by European Parliament, Policy Department – Economic and 
Scientific Policy, IP/A/ECON/ST/2007-27, March 2008, at iii. 
70 See S. Kingston, “The Boundaries of Sovereignty: The ECJ’s Controversial Role Applying Internal Market 
Law to Direct Tax Matters” (2006-2007) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 9, 287-311. 
71 See D. Weber, “In Search of a (New) Equilibrium Between Tax Sovereignty and the Freedom of Movement 
Within the EC” (2006) Intertax 34, 585; and G. Bizioli, “Balancing the fundamental freedoms and tax 
sovereignty: some thoughts on recent ECJ case law on direct taxation” (2008) European Taxation 3, 133. On the 
contrary, M. Isenbaert has alerted for the distinction between sovereignty and competence, arguing that “direct 
taxation still falls exclusively within the Member States’ function sovereignty, they have not retained absolute 
or exclusive competence on the matter”, see n. 60 above, at 197. 
72 See J. Avery Jones, “Carry on Discriminating” (1995) British Tax Review 6, 525; D. Williams, “Asscher: The 
European Court and the Power to Destroy” (1997) EC Tax Review 6, 4; and P.J. Wattel, “Red Herrings in Direct 
Tax Cases Before the ECJ” (2004) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31(2), 81-95. 
73 See O. Thömmes, “Effect of ECJ Decisions on Budgets of EU Member States: EC Law Without Mercy?” 
(2005) Intertax 33(12), 560-561. 
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fundamental freedoms to tax matters.74  All tend to point to the inconsistency and unpredictability of 
the Court’s decisions, with serious consequences for legal certainty.  The controversy caused by the 
tax jurisprudence of the Court is such, and its budgetary consequences so considerable, that at the 
Intergovernmental Conference which preceded the defunct European Constitution in 2003 the 
representatives of some Member States reportedly considered stripping the Court of its jurisdiction 
over tax cases –75 and not for the first time.76
3.2 (Not)Applying the constitutional instrumental chain to direct taxation 
 
Notwithstanding the above, and amidst all the criticism to the Court’s role as regards direct taxation, 
very few, if any, have asked the fundamental, somewhat preliminary, question: is it working? 
Regardless of any other parallel considerations, the ultimate aim remains the establishment of an EU 
Internal Market as defined in the Treaties – a legal term with economic significance and rationale, 
namely that of establishing a level playing field and increasing neutrality within the EU.77  So the key 
question must be asked, is the tax jurisprudence of the Court of Justice contributing towards the 
ultimate aim of establishing an European Internal Market, as per the constitutional mandate prescribed 
in the Treaties?78  Some simply assume that the Court’s rulings are effective steps towards achieving 
an Internal Market,79 without any actual assessment of its overall effects beyond the specificities of 
each case.  Others seem to implicitly,80 or explicitly,81
                                                 
74 See G. Kofler and R. Mason, “Double Taxation: A European ‘Switch in Time?’” (2007) Columbia Journal of 
European Law 14, 63. 
 assume that for the Court non-discrimination is 
75 See F. Vanistendael, “The ECJ at the crossroads: balancing tax sovereignty against the imperatives of the 
Single Market” (2006) European Taxation 9, 413-420. 
76 See Memorandum presented by the United Kingdom and Germany during the Intergovernmental Conference 
which preceded the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.  Indeed, some Member States are said to have 
initially supported the view that either direct taxation was a priori excluded from the scope of EU law (strict 
sovereignty exception), or that the Treaty only applied to direct taxation insofar as a certain degree of 
harmonisation had been reached (moderate sovereignty exception), see G.W. Kofler, “Austria”, in C. Brokelind 
(ed.), Towards a Homogeneous EC Direct Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2007), 59-100, at 59. 
77 As A. Cordewener also points out “more or less formalistic problems should, however, not obstruct the view 
to the fact that the ECJ is continuously pursuing one major aim in substance, and that is the integration of 
several domestic markets into one EU-wide single market”, in n. 65 above, at 4. 
78 Although some commentators have acknowledged the instrumental and subordinate nature, from a 
constitutional perspective, of taxation and non-discrimination to the concept of internal market, see C. 
Sacchetto, “ECJ Direct Tax Cases and Domestic Constitutional Principles: an Overview” in R. Avi-Yonah, J.R. 
Hines Jr., and M. Lang (eds.), Comparative Fiscal Federalism – Comparing the European Court of Justice and 
he US Surpreme Court’s Tax Jurisprudence (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2007), 1-9. 
79 As J. Malherbe et al state “As to corporate income tax, landmark rulings […] can be seen as significant steps 
towards the achievement of the Internal Market”, see n. 69 above, at iv. 
80 See F.C. de Hosson, n. 60 above, particularly at 297 and 302; M. Lang, “Double Taxation and EC Law” in R. 
Avi-Yonah, J.R. Hines Jr., and M. Lang (eds.), n. 78 above, 11-53; K. van Raad, “Nondiscrimination from the 
Perspective of the OECD Model and the EC Treaty – Structural and Conceptual Issues” in R. Avi-Yonah, J.R. 
Hines Jr., and M. Lang (eds.), n. 78 above, 55-66; and M. Aujean, “The Future of Non-Discrimination – Direct 
Taxation in Community Law” in R. Avi-Yonah, J.R. Hines Jr., and M. Lang (eds.), n. 78 above, 321-330.  
Although criticising this approach, see also R. Mason and M.S. Knoll, “What is Tax Discrimination?” (2011) 
Yale Law Journal 121. 
81 S. van Thiel argues that the Court does not rule on the basis of neutrality objectives, “what the ECJ has done, 
up to now, is to prohibit the tax system of one single Member State from discriminating against cross border as 
compared to domestic economic activity, either by imposing a higher tax on an incoming economic activity 
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in itself the objective.  Both assumptions are, however, unjustified.  Assuming that the objectives of 
the Internal Market are being achieved by the jurisprudence of the Court, without questioning this 
process, seems rather naïve.  On the other hand, and as demonstrated above, from a constitutional 
perspective non-discrimination is not in itself the objective but rather an instrument towards the 
achievement of the ultimate objective of establishing a European Internal Market.  The fact that in tax 
cases the Court often just refers to non-discrimination and the removal of obstacles to the fundamental 
freedoms is not an impediment to drawing this conclusion – rather it appears to provide an archetypal 
example of method being confused with the objective itself.  Such confusion is not only contrary to 
the constitutional mandate set out in the Treaties, but it can also be traced-back to the source of some 
of the frustration caused by the CJEU tax jurisprudence. 
Notwithstanding the above, in recent years a few authors have proposed a different approach to assess 
the CJEU jurisprudence on direct taxation, namely by resorting to economic concepts and analysis.  
The first study, published in 2000, focuses upon the interaction between free movement and direct 
taxation of individuals.82
A second study, published in 2006, proposes that – in the absence of further legislative harmonisation 
– the CJEU should display more restraint in its interpretation and its application of the concept of non-
discrimination.
  It argues that, whilst there are issues in direct tax cases that are amenable to 
analysis through the discrimination test, the type of interaction between different national tax systems 
that characterises these cases often makes non-discrimination an inappropriate test.  The author 
therefore proposes a new methodology, grounded in economic analyses and capable of identifying, 
with more precision, situations where tax systems interfere with the free movement of persons: the 
cross migration test.  This test would operate as a complementary criterion to non-discrimination, i.e. 
as a means to identify costly taxation – national tax measures which create costs to potential migrants, 
and consequently constitute obstacles to free movement – where the discrimination approach would 
be unsuitable.  According to the author the test has the advantage of offering a precise approach to 
understanding where taxation constitutes a real obstacle to the free movement of individuals, in 
particular providing a way of distinguishing those situations from others where taxation actually 
creates an incentive for migration. 
83
                                                                                                                                                        
(discriminatory market access restriction) or a higher tax on an outbound economic activity (discriminatory exit 
restriction)”, see “The Future of the Principle of Non-Discrimination in the EU” in R. Avi-Yonah, J.R. Hines Jr., 
and M. Lang (eds.), n. 78 above, 331-400, at 344. 
  The authors argue that the requirement of non-discrimination is too one-
dimensional for many issues of income tax design, and making it the sole decision criterion in tax 
cases necessarily suppresses other relevant considerations of efficiency, fairness, and administrability 
that should inform tax policy choices.  They conclude that the CJEU approach is ultimately incoherent 
82 See I. Roxan, “Assuring Real Freedom of Movement in EU Direct Taxation” (2000) Modern Law Review 
63(6), 831-876. 
83 M.J. Graetz and A.C. Warren, Jr, “Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of 
Europe” (2006) Yale Law Journal 115, 1186-1255. 
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because it is a quest for an unattainable goal: to eliminate discrimination based on both origin and 
destination of economic activity in the absence of harmonised corporate income tax bases and rates 
amongst Member States.  In this context, the authors consider that there are only two options, either 
greater harmonisation of corporate tax bases and rates – which they consider unlikely – or the exercise 
of greater restraint by the Court when interpreting and applying the concept of non-discrimination.  
The article therefore proposes the adoption of one of two possible, and more modest, approaches.  The 
first approach would be to view the fundamental freedoms as only precluding a Member State from 
taxing more heavily income that crosses its borders than income that does not.84  Member States 
would therefore be required to only apply capital import neutrality to incoming investment and capital 
export neutrality to outgoing investment.85
Even more recently, it has been proposed that in common market contexts, such as the EU, non-
discrimination provisions should be interpreted to promote competitive neutrality.
  The second approach would be based on the manner in 
which double taxation treaties operate: source countries would agree to apply the same rates to 
incoming investment as they apply to domestic investment, while resident countries would apply the 
same rates to outgoing investment that they apply to domestic investment. 
86  The authors’ 
start-up point is the fact that despite its continuing and indeed expanding influence, a clear definition 
of tax discrimination has failed to emerge.  They identify the failure to articulate the underlying 
principle, or principles, behind the Court’s application of the concept of non-discrimination to tax as 
the main limitation, and therefore aim to present coherent guidelines for interpreting that concept.  
Drawing on traditional and modern economic theory they consider three alternative formulations of 
tax discrimination, namely locational, savings / leisure, and competitive neutrality.  Of these the 
authors propose competitive neutrality as the benchmark that should be adopted by the CJEU when 
applying the concept of discrimination to direct tax cases.87
                                                 
84 Also pointing towards a similar approach, see W. Schön, “Tax Competition in Europe – The Legal 
Perspective” (2000) EC Tax Review 9, 90-105. 
  They present two main arguments for 
their proposition.  First the fact that, courts already tend to invoke neutrality as a motivation for their 
tax discrimination decisions, and indeed the CJEU has been intuitively interpreting non-
discrimination in a manner which is broadly consistent with competitive neutrality.  As such, 
85 These concepts were first introduced by P. Musgrave (née Richmond), see P. Richmond, Taxation of Foreign 
Income: An Economic Analysis (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1963); and P. Musgrave, “United States 
Taxation of Foreign Investment: Issues and Arguments”, International Tax Program, Harvard Law School, 
1969.  For more recent developments to these concepts see in particular M. Devereux, “Capital Export 
Neutrality, Capital Import Neutrality, Capital Ownership Neutrality and All That”, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
1990; and M. Desai and J.R. Hines, Jr., “Evaluating International Tax Reform” (2003) National Tax Journal 56, 
487-502. 
86 See R. Mason and M.S. Knoll, n. 80 above. A connection between the Treaty's aim of establishing an Internal 
Market, and the need to promote tax neutrality has also been advocated by other commentators, see J. Englisch, 
n. 7 above. 
87 For a recent study on the concept of neutrality as applied to tax see M.P. Devereux, “Taxation of outbound 
direct investment: economic principles and tax policy considerations” (2008) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
24(4), 698-719.  See also M.S. Knoll, “Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality” (2011) Tax Law Review 44. 
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expressly identifying its endeavour as one seeking to maintain competitive neutrality could help bring 
predictability and coherence to an area that is generally viewed as lacking both.  Second, application 
of the concept of tax discrimination is intended to root out tax policies that distort competition 
between domestic residents and residents of fellow Member States, and competitive neutrality is the 
benchmark most concerned with maintaining a level playing field between resident and non-resident 
taxpayers.  Adopting a competitive neutrality construction of non-discrimination would also, they 
argue, be welfare-enhancing. 
These studies make important contributions, correctly pointing towards the need to consider the 
economic consequences of the CJEU direct tax jurisprudence.  However, the difficulty with these 
works is a degree of disregard for the constitutional dimension of the issue.  There seems to be a – 
widespread – assumption that non-discrimination is the focal concept within the Treaties, to be 
interpreted as an aim in itself, without any formal constitutional connection between it and economic 
concepts such as neutrality and a level playing field.  On the basis of that presumption, the authors 
appeal to a jurisprudential construction of non-discrimination that is in line with those concepts, or a 
jurisprudential development of a parallel test, which would in turn result in a (more) consistent and 
coherent approach by the Court to direct tax cases.  This is, however, an erroneous assumption.  As 
highlighted above, not only do the Treaties establish a clear connection between non-discrimination – 
and harmonisation – neutrality, a level playing field, and the establishment of an EU Internal Market, 
but this connection assumes the characteristics of a constitutional mandate.  The difference might 
appear to be inconsequential, but it is in fact fundamental: the Court’s interpretation and application 
of the concept of non-discrimination in a manner which increases neutrality and a level playing field 
is not optional, it is a constitutional imperative.  Applying the concept as an instrument to attain those 
objectives would not be a jurisprudential construction, but merely a reflection of the respect for that 
imperative; on the contrary, interpretation and application in a manner that fails to achieve increased 
neutrality or a level playing field, and therefore does not contribute to the establishment and the 
functioning of the Internal Market, is not a prerogative of the Court, and it would be fundamentally 
unacceptable under the Treaties. 
That this constitutional instrumental chain applies to direct tax matters is clear.  As highlighted above, 
the Treaty itself establishes the connection between taxation and the aim of establishing an EU 
Internal Market. Moreover this connection has been expressly accepted, and indeed consistently 
invoked by the various European institutions, including the Court, since the initial stages of the 
European integration process.  Whilst there is no universally accepted definition of what an internal 
market requires in terms of taxation, the need to respect the constitutional instrumental chain has been 
a continuous presence, either explicitly or implicitly, in European tax initiatives since the Neumark 
Report, which established a clear connection between harmonisation, neutrality and the establishment 
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of a European Internal Market.88  Significantly a large section of the Ruding Report was devoted to 
investment distortions caused by differences in national corporate tax systems – i.e. the establishment 
of a level playing field in so far as taxation was concerned – with an ultimate view to establishing an 
Internal Market.89  A similar approach was adopted by the European Commission in its 2001 report 
on company taxation in the Internal Market.90
It is thus argued here, that from a constitutional perspective achieving non-discrimination within 
direct taxation is not enough per se.  Like harmonisation, non-discrimination is merely an instrument, 
the application of which should result in the level playing field and increased neutrality that 
characterises an Internal Market.  If the tax jurisprudence of the CJEU is not fulfilling that objective, 
if striking-down discriminatory national measures is not creating a more level playing field and / or 
increasing the level of neutrality, then important issues must be considered and re-evaluated. First, 
and from a more formalist perspective, it is questionable whether this jurisprudence can still be 
regarded as harmonisation – albeit negative.  Second and more importantly, from a substantive 
perspective, legitimacy issues and important constitutional implications should be considered, namely 
whether it is legitimate for the Court to intervene by repealing national corporate tax measures, under 
the constitutional mandate of establishing an EU Internal Market, if its decisions in that regard do not 
actually contribute to achieving that aim. 
 
In the next two parts we attempt to address these questions through an economic analysis of the 
Court’s tax jurisprudence.  In this context, we present two cases studies which are aimed at assessing 
the economic effects of the Court’s rulings, and in particular on improving the level-playing field and 
on increasing neutrality. These case studies have in common the fact that they both concern intra-
group transfers; but are distinct insofar as one concerns norms limitation of taxpayers rights and 
source-country discrimination against incoming investment, namely thin capitalisation rules, whilst 
the other focuses on a preferential regime and residence-country discrimination against outgoing 
investment, namely rules on transfer of cross-border losses under group consolidation regimes. 
                                                 
88 For an analysis of the Neumark Report from a corporate taxation perspective, see A.J. Martín Jiménez, n. 67 
above, at 107. 
89 See Ruding Committee, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee of Independent Experts on 
Company Taxation, Luxemburg: Commission of the European Communities, 1992.  For comments on the report 
see amongst others, M. Devereux, “The Ruding Committee Report : An Economic Assessment” (1992) Fiscal 
Studies 13(2), 96-107; and A.L. Bovenberg and S. Cnossen “Company tax harmonization in the European 
Union: Some further thoughts on the Ruding Committee report” in M.I. Blejer and T. Ter-Minassian (eds.), 
Macroeconomic Dimensions of Public Finance. Essays in Honor of Vito Tanzi (London: Routledge, 1997). 
90 “As non-tax impediments to the functioning of the Internal Market have been mostly removed and the EU 
markets for goods, labour and capital become integrated, the allocation of capital (economic activities and 
investment) is increasingly sensitive to taxation. Firms and individuals benefit from the freedom to move their 
capital to locations where the highest after-tax returns can be obtained and their investment decisions are thus 
more responsive to differences in effective tax rates between countries than without the Internal Market. At the 
same time, however, tax obstacles may still hamper the exercise of this freedom. It is therefore logical for the 
mandate to call for the analysis of these two - different but related - factors jeopardising allocational efficiency 
in the Internal Market.”, see European Commission, Company Taxation in the Internal Market, COM(2001) 
582 (final), 23 October 2001, at 15. 
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4. Thin Capitalisation Rules and the Judgment in Lankhorst-Hohorst: Case Study One 
A company is said to be ‘thinly capitalized’ when it has a high proportion of debt capital in relation to 
its equity capital.  The significant differences that apply in most countries to the tax treatment of debt 
on one hand, and equity on the other,91 have made thin capitalisation a popular method of 
international tax planning, often also designated as profit shifting. As a result, many Member States – 
although not all – apply anti-thin capitalisation rules.92 For years this divergence in Member States’ 
treatment of thin capitalization had been acknowledged as a potential source of difficulties, not least 
double taxation. However, the potential incompatibility of these rules with the Treaty was left almost 
untouched until 2004 with the Court’s ruling in Lankhorst-Hohorst.93
Lankhorst-Hohorst was not the first ruling to impact on the phenomenon – the Netherlands, which 
until 2003 did not apply a thin capitalisation rule, introduced one that year reportedly in response to 
the CJEU ruling in Bosal Holding.
 
94 It was Lankhorst-Hohorst, however, which had the most 
significant impact. Until 2002, most Member States applying thin capitalisation rules – similarly to 
other OECD countries – limited its scope of application to situations of “inbound investment”, i.e. 
where the lender is a non-resident company. However, the release of the Court’s ruling in Lankhorst-
Hohorst that same year fundamentally changed this approach. The Court held in that case that 
German thin capitalisation rules, insofar as they applied exclusively to non-residents, contravened the 
freedom of establishment, as set out in the Treaties. The decision had an overwhelming impact within 
the Union has a whole.  Following the decision in Lankhorst-Hohorst it became clear to many 
Member States that their own thin capitalisation rules would not pass the ‘EU test’, and would be 
deemed to be in contravention of EU law, if they were so challenged.95 Moreover, under Article 4(3) 
TEU [ex Article 10 EC Treaty] Member States have the obligation to apply EU law as interpreted by 
the Court, and thus adapt their domestic rules accordingly.96
                                                 
91 For a recent study on this discrepancy in treatment see J. Vella, “The Asymmetrical Treatment of Debt and 
Equity Finance Under UK Tax Law” in D. Prentice and A. Reisberg (eds), Corporate Finance Law: UK and EU 
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
 
92 For a survey of Member States’ approach to thin capitalisation see A.P Dourado and R. de la Feria, “Thin 
Capitalization in the Context of the CCCTB” in M. Lang et al, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(Vienna: Linde Verlag, 2008), 817. 
93 Case C-324/00, [2002] ECR I-11779. 
94 Case C-168/01, Bosal Holding BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën, [2003] ECR I-9409. See M. de Wit and 
V. Tilanus, “Dutch Thin Capitalisation Rules ‘EU Proof’?” (2004) Intertax 32(4), 187-192; and A.C.P 
Bobeldijk and A.W. Hofman, “Dutch Thin Capitalisation Rules from 2004 Onwards” (2004) Intertax 32(5), 
254-261. 
95 See N. Vinther and E. Werlauff, “The need for fresh thinking about tax rules on thin capitalisation: the 
consequences of the judgment of the ECJ in Lankhorst-Hohorst” (2003) EC Tax Review 2, 97-106 
96 On the relevance of this provision and its status as a general principle of EU law, see J. Temple Lang, “Article 
10 EC – The Most Important ‘General Principle’ of Community Law”, and L.W. Gormley, “Some Further 
Reflections on the Development of General Principles of Law Within Article 10 EC” in U. Bernitz, J. Nergelius 
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In order to ensure compatibility with EU law in a post Lankhorst-Hohorst world, two avenues of 
action seemed to be available to Member States: either to extend the scope of application of thin 
capitalisation rules, in order to include resident companies;97 or to limit the scope of application of 
thin capitalisation rules, in order to exclude EU resident companies. Immediately following 
Lankhorst-Hohorst, a third avenue was suggested: that Member States might react simply by dropping 
thin capitalisation rules altogether and thus face “the full risk of base erosion”,98
4.1 The economic effects of Lankhorst-Hohorst: an economic model 
 which seen from a 
different perspective, could offer a very attractive tax environment for corporate investment. This 
concern, however, never seemed to materialise – indeed quite the opposite, as the overall number of 
Member States with thin capitalisation rules has increased since 2002, rather than decreased.  This 
essentially left Member States with the two previous avenues of action.  Opting for one of the other, 
however, is not inconsequential.  Different possible reactions of the Member States have very 
different implications for tax neutrality and level playing field in the EU market. In the following 
section, an economic model is developed which offers a framework for analysing this impact. 
In this section, a simple economic model is developed which permits an analysis of the impact of the 
Lankhorst-Hohorst ruling on tax neutrality and the level of playing field in the EU market. The model 
focuses upon the neutrality of taxation for the investment activity of different types of firms. Tax rates 
as well as tax bases differ across countries, and these differences distort the choice of firms where to 
invest (capital export neutrality), as well as the choice who invests in a given country (capital import 
neutrality).99
Consider a world of three countries called A, B, and C. All three countries are member states of an 
economic union (the European Union). The supply of savings in the union is fixed and denoted by 
 Whilst the CJEU rulings address specific discriminations between domestic and border 
crossing economic activity, they do not call into question corporate tax rate differences between 
countries. In this framework, forcing countries to remove certain types of discrimination between the 
tax treatment of domestic and border crossing economic activity does not necessarily reduce overall 
tax distortions in the EU market, as the following analysis shows. 
. 
We abstract from capital market integration with the rest of the world. There are four groups of firms, 
                                                                                                                                                        
and C. Cardner (eds.), General Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Wolters Kluwer, 2008), 75-114 and 303-314, respectively. 
97 Although some commentators were sceptical at the time on whether this approach would indeed bring 
domestic laws in line with EU law, see O. Thoemmes et al, “Thin Capitalisation Rules and Non-Discrimination 
Principles – An analysis of thin capitalisation rules in light of the non discrimination principle in the EC Treaty, 
double taxation treaties and friendship treaties” (2004) Intertax 32(3), 126-137, at 135; and “The New German 
Thin Capitalisation Rules: Tax Planning; Incompatibility with European Law” (2004) Intertax 32(8/9), 401-415.  
Others continue to question the compatibility of legislation adopting this type of approach with the Treaty, see J. 
Vella, n. 91 above. 
98 See D. Gutmann and L. Hinnekens, “The Lankhorst-Hohorst case.  The ECJ finds German thin capitalization 
rules incompatible with freedom of establishment” (2003) EC Tax Review 2, 90-97, at 96. 
99 On these concepts see in particular references cited in n. 86 above. 
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two national groups and two multinational groups. Group 1 is a national group and consists of a 
parent company (P1) and a subsidiary (S1), both located in country A. Group 2, located in country B, 
is also a national group and consists of a parent company (P2) and a subsidiary (S1), both located in 
B, i.e. it has the same structure as group 1. Groups 3 and 4 are multinational groups. The parent 
company of group 3 (P3) is located in country A, its subsidiary (S3) is located in country C. The 
parent company of group 4 (P4) is located in country B, its subsidiary (S4) is also located in country 
C. In all four groups, only the parent companies engage in production while the subsidiaries  have the 
task of financing the investment of their parents. For this purpose, they issue equity in the 
international capital market and pass on these funds to their parents in the form of an intra company 
loan. This implies that the parents pay interest to their financing subsidiaries. For groups 1 and 2, 
these interest payments remain within national borders whereas the intra firm interest payments in the 
multinational groups 3 and 4 flow from countries A and B to country C. The structure of the model is 
illustrated by figure 2. The arrows illustrate the interest payments. 
Fig. 2  
 
Assume that output of parent  j (j=P1, P2, P3, P4) is given by the production function 𝑄𝑗 �𝐾𝑗�, with 
𝑄′𝑗�𝐾𝑗� > 0, 𝑄′′𝑗�𝐾𝑗� < 0, where 𝐾𝑗is the parent’s capital stock. For simplicity, we abstract from 
other production factors like labour. Adding them would complicate the notation without changing the 
results. This production function implies that the marginal productivity of capital declines as the 
capital stock increases. The goods produced by the parents are sold in the common product market, at 
a given price. To simplify notation, we assume that the price is equal to one. As a result, the profit of 
group j can be expressed as  
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 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑄𝑗�𝐾𝑗� − 𝑖𝐾𝑗 − 𝑇𝑗𝑃 + 𝑖𝑗𝐾𝑗 − 𝑟𝑗𝐾𝑗 − 𝑇𝑗𝑆     (1) 
On the right hand side of (1), 𝑄𝑗�𝐾𝑗� is the revenue of the subsidiary, 𝑖𝑗𝐾𝑗 is the interest the parent 
company of group j pays to the subsidiary, 𝑇𝑗
𝑃is the corporate income tax paid by the parent, , 𝑇𝑗
𝑆  
stands for corporate income tax paid by the subsidiary, 𝑟𝑗𝐾𝑗  is the after tax return the subsidiary must 
offer to be able to raise funds in the union’s capital market. The corporate tax payment of the parent, 
𝑇𝑗
𝑃, is given by 
 𝑇𝑗
𝑃 = 𝑡𝑗𝑃(𝑄𝑗�𝐾𝑗� − 𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑗𝐾𝑗) 
where 𝑡𝑗
𝑃 is the corporate tax rate of the country where parent j is located and 𝑠𝑗 is the share of 
interest payments which can be deducted from the corporate tax base. The corporate tax payment of 
the of group j, 𝑇𝑗
𝑆, is given by 
𝑇𝑗
𝑆 = 𝑡𝑗𝑆𝑖𝑗𝐾𝑗 
where 𝑡𝑗
𝑆 is the corporate tax rate of the country where the subsidiary resides.  
In order to focus on the impact of international tax differences on the cost of capital of different 
groups, we assume that, in the absence of taxes, all groups would face the same cost of capital. This 
implies that the interest rate on intra group interest payments, i, as well as the non-tax refinancing cost 
of the different parent companies, r, are the same for all groups.  
Given this, we can express (1) as 
 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑄𝑗�𝐾𝑗� − 𝑖𝐾𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗𝑃(𝑄𝑗�𝐾𝑗� − 𝑠𝑗𝑖𝐾𝑗) + 𝑖𝐾𝑗 − 𝑟𝐾𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗𝑆𝑖𝐾𝑗    (2) 
All groups choose the profit maximizing investment levels for their subsidiaries, which means that 
they will increase their capital stock until the increase in revenue generated by the last unit of 
investment equals the capital cost. Formally, the profit maximizing capital stock of subsidiary j is 
derived by maximizing the right hand side of (2). The result can be expressed as: 
 𝑄′𝑗(𝐾𝑗) = 𝐶𝑗 ,           (3) 
with  
 𝐶𝑗 = 1�1−𝑡𝑗𝑃� (𝑟 + 𝑖(𝑡𝑗𝑆 − 𝑡𝑗𝑃𝑠𝑗))         (4) 
where 𝐶𝑗 is the capital cost of group j. The capital cost 𝐶𝑗  is the return the group must generate to 
pay taxes and the after tax return required by the investors.  
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Taxes paid by any individual group  depend on the location of the parent company, and the location of 
the subsidiary. If two parent companies are located in different jurisdictions or if their subsidiaries are 
located in different countries, their cost of capital may differ due to tax differences across 
jurisdictions, so that their optimal investment levels differ, too. Other things equal, parent companies 
with low capital costs will invest more and vice versa. It is important to note that our model is 
deliberately constructed so that differences in capital costs across groups can only be caused by 
differences in taxes. All non-tax factors affecting the cost of capital are assumed to be equal, as our 
analysis focuses upon the impact of tax differences. Where there are such differences, there is no level 
playing field in taxation, and as a result the allocation of capital in the EU market in our model is 
distorted. The larger the tax differences, the larger the economic distortions caused by the tax system. 
Put differently, differences in the cost of capital in our model imply that capital export neutrality is 
violated – taxes distort the location of investment. 
In our model, differences in the cost of capital between groups can be caused by differences in the 
relevant tax parameters 𝑡𝑗
𝑃 , 𝑠𝑗 and 𝑡𝑗𝑆. Equation (4) shows that the cost of capital is higher, the higher 
the tax rates faced by the subsidiary, 𝑡𝑗𝑆, and the smaller the share of interest costs which can be 
deducted from the parent’s tax base, 𝑠𝑗. The impact of the parent’s tax rate, 𝑡𝑗
𝑃 , is slightly more 
complicated. In most cases, an increase in this tax rate will also increase the cost of capital. The 
opposite can only occur in rather special cases like e.g. a situation where the interest rate for intra 
group borrowing, i, is higher than the cost of raising funds faced by the parent company, r, the 
deductibility of intra group interest payments, 𝑠𝑗, is large, and the tax rate of the subsidiary, 𝑡𝑗𝑆, is 
small. In this case, an increase in 𝑡𝑗
𝑃 may increase the value of interest deductions by so much that the 
cost of capital declines. But we will focus on situations where these anomalies are excluded.  
In the following, we will consider and compare six different tax regimes. A tax regime is a 
combination of corporate income tax policies (𝑡𝑗
𝑆, 𝑠𝑗, 𝑡𝑗𝑃), j=S1, S2, S3, S4. The tax rates are the same 
in all regimes whereas the deductibility of interest payments differs. Therefore each regime can be 
characterized by referring only to the values of the interest deductibility parameters of the four 
subsidiaries: 𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠3, 𝑠4 .  
We start by considering a regime representing the situation before the intervention of the CJ ruling – 
we refer to this as the benchmark regime. In this situation, we assume that countries A and B both 
restrict the deductibility of border crossing interest payments, but not of interest payments between 
domestic firms. In the notation of our model, this is expressed as: 𝑠1, = 𝑠2 = 1, 𝑠3, 𝑠4 < 1. 
As results from the CJEU jurisprudence, this combination of interest deduction rules is in conflict 
with EU law insofar as border crossing investment is discriminated relative to domestic investment. 
We therefore measure the impact of Court’s ruling by comparing the benchmark situation to different 
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possible scenarios of how the Member States may react to the ruling. In the simple framework of our 
model, countries A and B essentially have two options to comply with the Court’s ruling: they may 
either abolish all restrictions on interest deductibility, or they may extend the restriction to interest 
payments between domestic firms.100
Finally, we also consider a scenario where governments do not comply with the Court’s ruling, and 
thus implicitly with EU law. We do so in light of the fact that it is clear from empirical analysis that 
Member States do sometimes preserve tax rules, which are potentially in conflict with EU law. In 
these cases, Member States seem to take the risk that this particular rule will (not) be struck down by 
future CJ rulings.
 Since there are two countries in our model and two possible 
reactions of national tax policy to the CJEU ruling, we have to consider four possible scenarios where 
Member States comply with it. The first two scenarios involve symmetric reactions by the two 
countries: either both countries abolish restrictions on deductibility, or they both extend the 
restrictions to domestic payments. These scenarios are represented by tax regimes 2 and 3. The other 
two scenarios involve asymmetric reactions, represented by regimes 4 and 5.  
101
 𝐶𝑗
𝑅6 = 1
�1−𝑡𝑗
𝑃�
(𝑟 + 𝑖(𝑡𝑗𝑆 − 𝑡𝑗𝑃[𝑞𝑠𝑗𝑅1 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑞𝑠𝑗𝑅𝑅])     (5) 
 We account for these cases by assuming that there is a sixth tax regime where 
firms face some uncertainty about the tax law that will finally apply. In this regime, the tax rules of 
the benchmark scenario will continue to apply with some probability denoted by q, with 0<q<1. With 
probability (1-q), the restriction of interest deductibility will be struck down, though, and the 
restriction on border crossing interest deductibility will not be applied. In order to avoid multiplying 
the number of scenarios under consideration, we only consider the case where country A (the country 
with the higher tax rate) does not comply and country B complies by abolishing border crossing 
interest deductibility. In this case, the formula for the (expected value of) the cost of capital is given 
by  
 
where 𝑠𝑗
𝑅1is the interest deduction in the benchmark regime and 𝑠𝑗𝑅𝑅 is the interest deduction 
which applies in country j after all non-complying countries have been forced to comply. The 
six tax regimes are summarized in table 1. 
 
 
                                                 
100 See point 4.1 above. 
101 This might indeed be a rational risk, as whether or not a specific domestic tax rule is attacked for its 
incompatibility with EU law is a relatively random and unsystematic approach, since it depends on either a case 
being litigated in the national courts and then being referred to the CJEU, or on the Commission launching 
infringement proceedings – none of which is a reliable occurrence; see C. HIJ Panayi, “Reverse Subsidiarity and 
EU Tax Law: Can Member States be Left to Their Own Devices?” (2010) British Tax Review 3, 261-301, at 297 
et seq. 
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Table 1: Tax Regimes and Restrictions on Interest Deductibility 
 COUNTRY A COUNTRY B 
 
NATIONAL 
INTEREST 
PAYMENTS 
BORDER CROSSING 
INTEREST PAYMENTS 
NATIONAL 
INTEREST 
PAYMENTS 
BORDER 
CROSSING 
INTEREST 
PAYMENTS 
REGIME 1 
(BENCHMARK) 
 
𝑠1 = 1 𝑠3 < 1 𝑠2 = 1 𝑠4 < 1 
REGIME 2 
(SYMMETRIC) 
 
𝑠1 = 1 𝑠3 = 1 𝑠2 = 1 𝑠4 = 1 
REGIME 3 
(SYMMETRIC) 
 
𝑠1 < 1 𝑠3 = 𝑠1 < 1 𝑠2 < 1 𝑠4 = 𝑠2 < 1 
REGIME 4 
(ASYMMETRIC) 
 
𝑠1 = 1 𝑠3 = 𝑠1 = 1 𝑠2 < 1 𝑠4 = 𝑠2 < 1 
REGIME 5 
(ASYMMETRIC) 
 
𝑠1 < 1 𝑠3 = 𝑠1 < 1 𝑠2 = 1 𝑠4 = 1 
REGIME 6 
(ASYMMETRIC) 
 
𝑠1 = 1 𝑠3  𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛  𝑠2 = 1 𝑠4 = 1 
 
What are the implications of these different regimes for tax distortions and economic welfare in the 
Union? In order to be able to compare the different possible regimes, we use a simple numerical 
version of our model. The numerical model allows for comparison between the differences in the cost 
of capital emerging in the different regimes. It also allows for a calculation of the costs of tax 
distortions and overall welfare levels.  
4.2 Numerical version of the economic model 
In order to better analyse the implications of the different tax regimes described in the preceding 
section, this section develops a simple and slightly extended numerical version of our model. Firstly, 
we assume that the marginal utility of public funds, which we denote by the variable η, is higher than 
the marginal utility of private funds. Where this was not the case, the best policy in our model would 
be not to levy taxes at all. To make things simple, we further assume that the marginal utility of public 
funds is equal to 1.1 in all countries whereas the marginal utility of private funds is equal to unity. In 
addition, we assume that the production function takes the quadratic form 𝑄𝑗�𝐾𝑗� = 𝛼𝑗𝐾𝑗 − 𝛽𝑗𝐾𝑗2 . 
The parameter values are given in table 2. 
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Table 2: Parameter Values 
BASE MODEL NUMERICAL MODEL (BASE CASE) 
𝛼𝑗  1 
𝛽𝑗  0.04 
𝑡𝐴  
0.4 
𝑡𝐵  
0.15 
𝑡𝐶  
0.3 
𝜂 1.1 
q 0.1 
𝐾� 40 
 
The numerical model allows us to calculate capital costs, investment levels, tax revenues, and overall 
production for each of the tax regimes under consideration. It should kept in mind that the parameters 
used are not derived from estimates of what the true parameters might be, and that therefore the 
numerical model merely provides an example which illustrates the underlying theoretical model. 
Consider first the capital costs of the different subsidiaries in our model. If all subsidiaries in the 
model faced the same capital costs, there would be no tax distortions within the EU market, but as a 
result of tax rates differences across countries, capital costs will differ both before the CJEU ruling 
(benchmark regime) and after the ruling. The interesting question, however, is whether the CJ ruling 
increases or decreases differences in capital costs caused by taxation. In our model, we investigate this 
by considering the variance of the capital costs before and after the ruling. Figure 3 gives an overview 
over the capital costs of the individual subsidiaries in each of the six tax regimes. 
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0.12
0.14
0.16
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Fig. 3: Capital Costs of the Subsidiaries in the 
Different Tax Regimes
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P3
P4
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Consider first the move from the benchmark regime, to regime 2, where countries A and B abolish the 
restrictions on the deductibility of border crossing interest payments. The result in this case is that 
differences in capital costs decline. In the benchmark regime, the subsidiary of the multinational 
group operating in the high tax country (country A) faces the highest capital costs. This subsidiary 
benefits most from the abolition of the restrictions, so that its capital costs decline significantly. The 
overall differences in capital costs, measured by the variance, decline, as is shown by Figure 4. 
 
It thus turns out that the CJEU ruling had the presumably intended effect,102
 
 a move towards a more 
level playing field in corporate taxation, and as such a confidence step towards achieving an Internal 
Market. Figure 5 summarizes the impact on overall production. Comparing the benchmark regime and 
regime 2 again shows that the impact is positive – the move therefore also increases production.  
 
                                                 
102 See discussion below point 5.2. 
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However, as explained in the preceding sections, Member States may react to the Court’s ruling not 
just by moving to regime 2, but rather by changing their tax policy and moving to / applying one of 
the other five tax regimes. Regime 3 is a regime where the Member States react symmetrically and 
abolish interest deductibility for both national and border crossing payments. Figure 4 shows that, 
perhaps surprisingly, this reaction increases the capital cost differences. This happens because given 
tax rate differences have a larger impact if the tax base is broadened, as is the case when the 
deductibility of interest payments is restricted. Here, production declines.  
Consider next the asymmetric regimes 4 and 5. Regime 4 has positive effects: differences in capital 
costs decline and production and welfare increase relative to the benchmark scenario. This happens 
because the low tax country broadens its tax base, whereas the high tax country narrows the base that 
in turn leads to a convergence of effective tax burdens. The existing asymmetry in tax rates is 
therefore mitigated by another, diametrically opposed asymmetry in the tax base. The high tax 
country (country A) compensates firms for the higher tax rates by offering a full deductibility of 
interest payments whereas the low tax country (country B) goes along with limited interest 
deductibility. In regime 5 the opposite happens. If the country with the higher tax rate reacts to the 
ruling by extending the restriction on interest deductibility to purely national tax payments whereas 
the low tax country abolishes all restrictions, the effective tax burdens in these countries drift further 
apart. As a result, overall production in the Union declines. Finally, regime 6 is a scenario where the 
low tax country allows for full interest deductibility both nationally and across borders; whilst the 
high tax country also allows for full domestic deductibility, but restricts border-crossing deductibility. 
There is some probability, however, that such a discrimination will be struck down by a CJEU ruling, 
so that full deductibility is granted for border-crossing payments as well. In this regime, we have two 
countervailing effects on tax distortions: the fact that the low tax country extends full deductibility to 
border crossing interest payments increases the differences in effective tax burdens between the two 
countries, compared to the benchmark case; the fact that the high tax country will also have to grant 
deductibility with some probability tends to reduce the tax gap. Note that an extension of interest 
deductibility in the high tax country leads to a stronger reduction in effective tax burdens than the 
same increase in deductibility in the low tax country, because the value of deductions is higher if the 
tax rate is higher. In the example considered here, the probability that a CJEU ruling enforces 
deductibility of border crossing interest payments is assumed to equal only 10 per cent. This is why 
the tax burdens drift further apart. Nevertheless it can be shown that, if a higher probability of CJEU 
intervention is assumed, the result may change and effective tax burdens may actually converge. 
 32 
To summarize, the numerical version of our economic model shows that the impact of CJEU rulings 
on tax distortions and, hence, on the efficiency of the capital allocation in the EU market depends 
upon the way in which Member States react to the ruling. Depending on those reactions tax distortions 
may increase. This happens in particular where the high tax country reacts by extending restrictions 
on interest deductibility to national payments, whilst the low tax country reacts by extending full 
deductibility to border crossing payments as well. Of course, these results must be seen in the light of 
the highly stylised nature of the model we use – we come back to the limitations of the economic 
analysis further below. Before we do so, however, it is interesting to confront our theoretical results 
with the observed reactions of Member States to the Lankhorst-Hohorst ruling. 
4.3 Member States’ reactions to Lankhorst-Hohorst 
Whether the implicit aim of the CJEU in Lankhorst-Hohorst – by determining that thin capitalisation 
rules contravened EU law insofar as they applied to EU residents – was essentially to put all debt 
investment within Europe on an equal position insofar as tax restrictions were concerned, i.e. to level 
the playing field, or merely to abolish discrimination, is unclear.103
First, it is relevant to note that, approval of amendments in order to bring national legislation in line 
with Court’s rulings is far from automatic.
 What is clear, however, is that, as 
a result of Member States’ reaction to the ruling, non-discrimination in itself might have been 
achieved, but a level playing field and increased neutrality was not. 
104  Levels of compliance vary across Member States and 
on the specific ruling.  Some Member States have a better track record of compliance than others – 
with non-compliance often characterised as a more evident phenomenon in southern Member States –
105 and certain rulings result in higher levels of compliance then others.106
                                                 
103 See above point 3.2. 
  Moreover, even where 
compliance takes place, implementation of these rulings can vary greatly amongst Member States for 
numerous reasons, including ignorance and lack of awareness on the part of domestic legislators, 
budgetary concerns, unclearness of the rulings themselves, and even cultural differences.  It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that the reaction to Lankhorst-Hohorst was far from uniform. Some Member 
States, such as Spain and Portugal, did restrict their thin capitalisation rules, removing intra-EU 
situations from their scope.  Other, however, such as Germany and Denmark, followed the first 
approach set out above, i.e. they extended the scope of thin capitalisation rules to apply to purely 
domestic situations. This led to further discrepancies in the scope of application of the various thin 
capitalisation rules within the EU.  
104 This phenomenon has been designated of “reverse subsidiarity”, see C. HIJ Panayi, n. 101 above. 
105 See F. de Hosson, n. 60 above, at 299; and M. Wathelet, “Direct Taxation and EU Law: Integration and 
Desintegration” (2004) EC Tax Review 13(1), 2-4, at 3. 
106 See generally P. Farmer and A. Zalasinski, “General Report” in X.L. Xehopoulos (ed.), Direct Tax Rules and 
the EU Fundamental Freedoms: Origin and Scope of the Problem; National and Community Responses and 
Solutions (Nicosa: FIDE, 2006); C. Brokelind, n. 76 above, including country reports therein; and C. HIJ 
Panayi, n. 101 above. 
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Table 3: National Reactions to Lankhorst-Hohorst 
 SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THIN CAPITALISATION RULES 
(X= thin capitalisation rule applies; – = no thin capitalisation rule applies) 
 BEFORE RULING AFTER RULING 
 
NATIONAL 
EU 
MEMBER 
STATES 
THIRD 
COUNTRIES NATIONAL 
EU 
MEMBER 
STATES 
THIRD 
COUNTRIES 
AUSTRIA – – – – – – 
BELGIUM – X X – – X 
BULGARIA    X X X 
CYPRUS – – – – – – 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
   X X X 
DENMARK – X X X X X 
ESTONIA – – – – – – 
FINLAND – – – – – – 
FRANCE107 –  X X X X X 
GERMANY – X X X X X 
GREECE – – – X X X 
HUNGARY    X X X 
IRELAND – X X – – X 
ITALY – X X X X X 
LATVIA – – – – – X 
LITHUANIA – – – X X X 
LUXEMBOURG X X X X X X 
MALTA – – – – – – 
NETHERLANDS – – – X X X 
POLAND – X X X X X 
PORTUGAL – X X – – X 
ROMANIA    X X X 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
   – – – 
SLOVENIA    X X X 
SPAIN – X X – – X 
SWEDEN – – – – – – 
UNITED 
KINGDOM108
– 
 
X X X X X 
                                                 
107 Thin capitalisation rules have been recently amended in France, where the Finance Bill 2011 extended their 
scope to include loans guaranteed by a related party, such as bank loans. 
108 Although the amendments introduced by the United Kingdom to their cross-border group relief system seems 
to comply with the Court’s ruling insofar as it applies to EU Member States, doubts still linger over its de facto 
compatibility, since the conditions imposed for relief by the amended rules are much stricter than those set out 
in the Marks & Spencer judgment, see C. HIJ Panayi, n. 101 above. As a result the European Commission 
announced in late 2009 that it had initiated infringement proceedings against the United Kingdom, see 
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Table 3 above summarises the territorial scope of application of these rules – or rules to the same 
effect – before and after the ruling in Lankhorst-Hohorst. Consideration of the amendments 
introduced by Member States following Lankhorst-Hohorst seems therefore to indicate that it is 
Regime 5 above, which has prevailed.  Not only did Member States react asymmetrically, i.e. some 
opted to extend the scope of their thin capitalisation rules, whilst others opted to restrict them; but it 
was those Member States which apply higher rates of corporate tax that tended towards widening the 
scope of their thin capitalisation rules, in order to encompass domestic situations, whereas it was those 
Member States which apply lower rates of corporate tax tended to limit the scope of their thin 
capitalisation rules, excluding intra-EU situations from their scope.  The asymmetry of Member 
States’ reaction to Lankhorst-Hohorst is hardly surprising – indeed some commentators have 
challenged the use of the term negative harmonisation to characterise the CJEU tax jurisprudence 
precisely on the basis of the asymmetry of Member States’ reaction to the rulings.109
 
  Unsurprising too 
are the negative economic effects of such asymmetry.  Less intuitive perhaps is the fact that a 
symmetric reaction by Member States can also give rise to negative economic effects, namely a 
decrease in neutrality and in the level-playing field, as Regime 3 above demonstrates.  It follows 
therefore that whilst symmetry does indeed imply elimination of discrepancies between national tax 
legislation, it does not necessarily bring the EU closer to an Internal Market. 
5. Group Consolidation Regimes and the Judgment in Marks & Spencer: Case Study Two 
Virtually all Member States within the EU treat profits and losses asymmetrically: profits are taxed in 
the year in which they are earned; while losses are not refunded where they are incurred, but rather 
offset against future profits.110  In general, domestic relief of losses is automatically available within 
the same company, and available under specific rules within a group of companies in most Member 
States.  In most cases, cross-border relief is also available within the same company (permanent 
establishments); on the contrary however traditionally cross border relief of losses was usually not 
available within a group a companies (subsidiaries).111
                                                                                                                                                        
Corporate Taxation: Commission requests the United Kingdom to properly implement an ECJ ruling on cross-
border loss compensation, Press Release IP/09/1461, 8 October 2009. 
 
109 See J. Malherbe et al, n. (.69 above, at 78. See also C. Brokelind, “Conclusions” in C. Brokelind (ed.), n. 76 
above, 401-406. 
110 See generally European Commission, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, Communication 
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social 
Committee, COM(2006) 824 final, 19 December 2006. 
111 Ibid at 3. 
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Whilst there had been previous cases regarding cross-border relief of losses within the same 
company,112 none had such a significant impact as Marks & Spencer, the first to focus upon cross-
border relief within a group.113 The case, concerning the compatibility of UK rules limiting the right 
of parent companies to deduct losses incurred by non-resident subsidiaries with the Treaty provision 
on freedom of establishment, generated massive controversy from the outset.114  The potential revenue 
impact of the ruling was the main reason for such controversy: as most Member States had in place 
rules similar to those of the UK and feared significant revenue losses if the Court was to find them 
incompatible with the Treaty.115
5.1 The economic effects of Marks & Spencer 
  Their fears would turn out to be only half-justified.  The Court found 
on the case that the UK group relief system was only in violation of the Treaty insofar as it did not 
allow losses incurred by subsidiaries in other Member States to be taken into account, where the 
possibilities for having those losses considered in the subsidiary’s state of residence had been 
exhausted.  Even then, despite its rather restrained scope, the ruling required significant amendment to 
most EU group relief systems.  In this context, and similarly to the situation post Lankhorst-Hohorst, 
following the decision in Marks & Spencer Member States essentially had two avenues of action 
available in order to bring their group consolidation regimes in line with the ruling: either to extend 
their consolidation regime to non-resident subsidiaries established within the EU; or, to do away with 
consolidation altogether.  Alternatively, a further avenue was also available to Member States: non-
compliance with the ruling. In the next section, we briefly consider the relevance of the Marks & 
Spencer ruling for tax distortions of investment in the EU market. 
How may CJEU jurisprudence on cross-border losses offset affect tax distortions of investment in the 
EU Market? Consider the following variant of the model introduced in section 4.1. It is now assumed 
that the financing subsidiaries of the four groups face some economic risks in their activity, and that 
                                                 
112 See in particular Cases C-250/95, Futura Participations SA and Singer v Administration des contributions, 
[1995] ECR I-2492; and C-141/99, Algemene Maatschappij voor Investering en Dienstverlening NV (AMID) v 
Belgische Staat, [2000] ECR I-11621. 
113 Case C-446/03, [2005] ECR I-10837. 
114 In addition to the references included below, see also M. Gammie, “The Impact of the Marks & Spencer Case 
on US-European Planning” (2005) Intertax 33(11), 485-489; P. Martin, “The Marks & Spencer EU group relief 
case - a rebuttal of the ’taxing jurisdiction’ argument'” (2005) 14 EC Tax Review 14(2), 61-68; M. Lang, “Marks 
and Spencer - more questions than answers: an analysis of the Opinion delivered by Advocate General Maduro” 
(2005) EC Tax Review 14(2), 95-100; G. T.K. Meussen, “The Marks & Spencer Case: The Final Countdown 
Has Begun” (2005) European Taxation 45(4), 160-163; M. Persoff, “Marks & Spencer: more questions than 
answers” (2006) British Tax Review 3, 260-267; T. Lyons, “Marks & Spencer: something for everyone?” (2006) 
British Tax Review 1, 9-14; M. Isenbaert and C. Valjemark, “M&S judgment: the ECJ caught between a rock 
and a hard place” (2006) EC Tax Review 15(1), 10-17; T. O’Shea, “Marks and Spencer v Halsey (HM Inspector 
of Taxes): restriction, justification and proportionality” (2006) EC Tax Review 15(2), 66-82; H. van den Hurk, 
“Cross-Border Loss Compensation – The ECJ’s Decision in Marks & Spencer and How It was Misinterpreted in 
the Netherlands” (2006) Bulletin for International Taxation 60(5), 178-186; Sjoerd Douma and Caroline 
Naumburg, “Marks & Spencer: Are National Tax Systems Éclaire?” (2006) European Taxation 46(9), 431-442; 
and M. Lang, “The Marks & Spencer Case – The Open Issues Following the ECJ’s Final Word” (2006) 
European Taxation 46(2), 54-67. 
115 See S. Kingston, n. 70 above, at 305; and G. Meussen, “The Marks & Spencer Case: Reaching the 
Boundaries of the EC Treaty” (2003) EC Tax Review 12(3), 144-148. 
 36 
this risk is directly related to their activity of raising funds for their parent company – or alternatively 
it is also possible to consider risk being generated by some additional financial or non-financial 
business activity. To keep things simple, assume that, on average, this activity generates a profit 
denoted by the variable  𝑧𝑗 per unit of capital  𝐾𝑗  with probability 0.5 and a loss of the same amount 
otherwise. This implies that the expected value of the loss or gain is equal to zero. In the case of a 
loss, the subsidiary has the interest income from borrowing to its parent company which can be set 
against the loss. But if  𝑧𝑗 > 𝑖 , the interest income is not enough and the question arises of whether or 
not the losses of the subsidiary can be set against profits of the parent company. We therefore assume  
𝑧𝑗 > 𝑖 , so that intra group loss offset becomes relevant. The loss offset regime has consequences for 
the tax burden faced by each group and, hence, for its costs of capital. The expected profit of group j 
can now be expressed as 
𝑃𝑗
𝐿 = 𝑄𝑗�𝐾𝑗� − 𝑡𝑗𝑃(𝑄𝑗�𝐾𝑗� − 𝑠𝑗𝑖𝐾𝑗) − 𝑟𝐾𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗𝑆𝑖𝐾𝑗 + 0.5𝐾𝑗(𝑧𝑗 − 𝑖)�𝑚𝑗𝑡𝑗𝑃 − 𝑡𝑗𝑆�  (6) 
where 𝑚𝑗 is a parameter describing the loss offset regime. Given this, we can derive the capital cost, 
using the same approach as in section 4.1. as: 
𝐶𝑗
𝐿 = 1
�1−𝑡𝑗
𝑃�
�𝑟 + 𝑖(𝑡𝑗𝑆 − 𝑡𝑗𝑃𝑠𝑗� − 0.5(𝑧𝑗 − 𝑖)�𝑚𝑗𝑡𝑗𝑃 − 𝑡𝑗𝑆�)     (7) 
The possible impact of the loss offset regime is described by the last term on the right hand side of 
equation (6). With a probability of 50 per cent the subsidiary makes a loss 𝐾𝑗(𝑧𝑗 − 𝑖). The tax 
consequences of this loss depend on the value of �𝑚𝑗𝑡𝑗
𝑃 − 𝑡𝑗
𝑆�. The simplest case is the case of a 
purely national group in a world with unrestricted intra group loss offset (m=1). In this case, the loss 
of the subsidiary can be transferred to the parent and the deduction is at the same tax rate, so that 
𝑚𝑗𝑡𝑗
𝑃 − 𝑡𝑗
𝑆 = 0. In this case the existence of risky income 𝑧𝑗 does not affect the cost of capital. In 
contrast, if intra group loss offset is restricted, the cost of capital increases in a purely national group. 
In an international group, things are more complicated. If the tax rate of the parent company is higher 
than that of the subsidiary the possibility that losses of the subsidiary may be set against income of the 
parent company may even reduce the cost of capital. 
Considering the scenarios analysed above in the context of interest deductibility, we can summarise 
their application to losses relief / offset, as follows in Table 4: 
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Table 4: Tax Regimes and Restrictions on Loss Offset 
 COUNTRY A COUNTRY B 
 
NATIONAL 
INTEREST 
PAYMENTS 
BORDER 
CROSSING 
INTEREST 
PAYMENTS 
NATIONAL 
INTEREST 
PAYMENTS 
BORDER 
CROSSING 
INTEREST 
PAYMENTS 
REGIME 1 
(BENCHMARK) 
 
𝑚1 = 1 𝑚3 < 1 𝑚2 = 1 𝑚4 < 1 
REGIME 2 
(SYMMETRIC) 
 
𝑚1 = 1 𝑚3 = 1 𝑚2 = 1 𝑚4 = 1 
REGIME 3 
(SYMMETRIC) 
 
𝑚1 < 1 𝑚3 = 𝑚1 < 1 𝑚2 < 1 𝑚4 = 𝑚2 < 1 
REGIME 4 
(ASYMMETRIC) 
 
𝑚1 = 1 𝑚3 = 𝑚1 = 1 𝑚2 < 1 𝑚4 = 𝑚2 < 1 
REGIME 5 
(ASYMMETRIC) 
 
𝑚1 < 1 𝑚3 = 𝑚1 < 1 𝑚2 = 1 𝑚4 = 1 
REGIME 6 
(ASYMMETRIC) 
 
𝑚1 = 1 𝑚3 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛  𝑚2 = 1 𝑚4 = 1 
 
A simple numerical version of our model as in section 4, with parameter values as described in Table 
2, is then considered. The additional parameter z has a value of 2 and we assume full interest 
deductibility in all regimes. In cases where loss offset is restricted we set m=0.  The results of the 
numerical analysis are displayed in figures 6 and 7, which reports the impact variance in the capital 
costs in the different regimes and the levels of production in the model. 
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Fig. 6: Variance of Capital Costs in the Five Tax 
Regimes (Loss Offset)
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Overall, the results are very similar to those of in case study one, as regards interest deductibility, and 
therefore confirm them. As would be expected, the differences in capital costs decline in regime 2, 
where all countries extend loss offset across borders, and they increase in regime 3, where loss offset 
within national groups is abolished.  While the extension of loss consolidation to losses incurred 
abroad reduces the significance of tax rate differences across countries, abolishing national 
consolidation increases their impact. The variance of capital costs also declines in the asymmetric 
scenario 4 where the high tax country opts for the extension of loss offset across borders while the 
low tax country chooses to restrict loss offset for both national and international groups. The opposite 
happens in regime 5. Regime 6, where the high tax country chooses not to comply with EU law, but 
could with some probability face a CJEU ruling, leads to approximately the same variance in capital 
costs as the benchmark scenario.  
 
 
As fig. 7 shows production is also at approximately the same level as in the benchmark regime. Here, 
the fact that the low tax country extends loss offset to border crossing operations increases the tax 
differences within the EU market. However, the fact that the high tax country might, with some 
positive probability, be forced to do it as well reduces the expected cost of capital in the high tax 
country. If this happens, the reduction in the cost of capital will be higher than in the low tax country, 
because the value of a given tax loss is higher in the high tax country. 
5.2 Member States’ reactions to Marks & Spencer 
Similarly what was said as regards the ruling in Lankhorst-Hohorst, it is unclear whether the implicit 
aim of the CJEU in Marks & Spencer was essentially to put outgoing investment within the EU on a 
99.86
99.88
99.9
99.92
99.94
99.96
99.98
100
100.02
100.04
100.06
Benchmark Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4 Regime 5 Regime 6
Fig. 7: Overall Production in the Different Tax 
Regimes (Loss Offset Model) 
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more neutral and level playing field position from a tax perspective, or merely to abolish 
discrimination.116
Table 4: National Reactions to Marks & Spencer 
  
 SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF GROUP RELIEF OF LOSSES RULES 
 BEFORE RULING AFTER RULING 
 
NATIONAL 
EU 
MEMBER 
STATES 
THIRD 
COUNTRIES NATIONAL 
EU 
MEMBER 
STATES 
THIRD 
COUNTRIES 
AUSTRIA X X X X X X 
BELGIUM – – – – – – 
BULGARIA – – – – – – 
CYPRUS X – – X – – 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
– – – – – – 
DENMARK X X X X X X 
ESTONIA – – – – – – 
FINLAND X – – X – – 
FRANCE X X X X X X 
GERMANY X – – X – – 
GREECE – – – – – – 
HUNGARY – – – – – – 
IRELAND X – – X X – 
ITALY X X X X X X 
LATVIA X – – X X – 
LITHUANIA X – – X X – 
LUXEMBOURG X – – X – – 
MALTA X – – X – – 
NETHERLANDS X – – X – – 
POLAND X – – X – – 
PORTUGAL X – – X – – 
ROMANIA    – – – 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
   – – – 
SLOVENIA X – – – – – 
SPAIN X – – X – – 
SWEDEN X – – X X – 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
X – – X X – 
 
X= Group relief of losses exists 
– = Group relief of losses does not exist 
                                                 
116 What is clear however was the position of the European Commission, urging Member States to review 
existing national in order to consider different alternatives which would provide relief for losses within groups 
in cross-border situations, see n. 110 above, at 11. 
 40 
As before, however, Member States’ reaction to the ruling must be taken into consideration.  As 
mentioned above, Member States’ reactions to CJEU rulings tend not to be homogenous – and Marks 
& Spencer was no exception.  Not solely there is a risk of non-compliance, but equally even where 
Member States comply with the ruling, its implementation can vary greatly. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the reaction to Marks & Spencer was so discrepant.  Table 4 above summarises the 
scope of application of cross-border group relief of losses rules before and after the ruling. 
It has been said that, when faced with the requirement to change their national tax legislations as a 
result of a judgment of the CJEU establishing the incompatibility of national rules with the Treaty, the 
reaction of Member States tends to be as follows: to extend application of norms limiting taxpayers’ 
rights in cross-border situations to domestic cases, rather than to abolish them for intra-EU cases; or, 
to abolish preferential domestic regimes, instead of extending them to cross border situations.117  The 
reaction of Member States to Lankhorst-Hohorst certainly seems to confirm this assertion – whilst the 
reaction was asymmetrical, many Member States preferred to extend the scope of application of their 
thin capitalisation rules to domestic situations, rather than to exclude EU situations from their scope.  
The reaction to Marks & Spencer is less clear, due to the role played by non-compliance.118
 
 The 
suspicion, however, is that if forced Member States would be more likely to abolish their group relief 
systems, rather than to extend them to cross-border situations, thus confirming the above statement.  
This empirical reality, coupled with the theoretical results presented above, will unavoidably give rise 
to particular concerns as regards the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate, set-out in the Treaties, 
of establishing an EU Internal Market. 
6. Significance of Results: Breaking the Instrumental Chain 
From the analysis undertaken in the two preceding sections it is clear that, the approach of the CJEU 
of striking down national tax provisions, which – in the language of the Court – are either 
discriminatory and/ or impose restrictions on the fundamental freedoms, does not necessarily increase 
neutrality or lead to a more level playing field, i.e. it does not reduce overall tax distortions in the 
European Internal Market.  This is particularly likely in those cases where, as a reaction to CJEU 
rulings, countries with high tax rates extend restrictive tax rules from border crossing to purely 
national economic transactions, whilst low tax countries extend a more generous treatment of national 
economic activity to border crossing transactions.  Empirically, this seems to have been precisely the 
                                                 
117 See P. Farmer and A. Zalasinski, n. 106 above. 
118 It has been suggested that might be one of the main reasons for this non-compliance was the fact that the 
ruling itself left many question unanswered about its scope of application, which were probably not clarified by 
later cases dealing with different group relief arrangements, see C. HIJ Panayi, n. 101 above.  Indeed the fact 
that more cases on this topic continue to arrive to the CJEU seems to be indicative of this lack of clarity, see 
Case C-18/11, The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs v Philips Electronics UK Ltd, 
Reference for a preliminary ruling from Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) (United Kingdom) made 
on 12 January 2011, OJ C 89, 19/03/2011, p. 11. 
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pattern of reactions by Member States to the Lankhorst-Hohorst ruling; the reaction of Member States 
to Marks & Spencer is less clear, however, with non-compliance seemly playing a significant role. 
The question which must be asked, therefore, is what is the significance of these results for assessing 
the Court’s jurisprudence on direct taxation? From a terminological perspective, it is difficult to 
perceive how this jurisprudence can still be regarded and/or designated, as negative harmonisation.  
Despite the inaccuracy highlighted above, the terminology may nevertheless have been regarded as 
legitimate insofar as the Court’s jurisprudence did indeed result in effective harmonisation, i.e. insofar 
as it led to increased neutrality and/or the establishment of a level playing field within Europe.  Yet, 
this not being the case, the use of this classification loses any potential legitimacy.  More importantly, 
from a substantive perspective, these results have significant constitutional implications, which in turn 
raise legitimacy issues.  If the approach being adopted by the Court as regards direct taxation, of 
striking-down national measures deemed to be discriminatory/restrictive, has not led to an increase in 
neutrality and a more level playing field across Member States, then it must be concluded that it is not 
contributing to the ultimate aim of establishing an EU Internal Market – in essence, as demonstrated 
in Figure 8, the constitutional instrumental chain has been broken. 
Figure 8: Broken Constitutional Instrumental Chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concluding that the constitutional instrumental chain has been broken has inescapable implications.  
The role adopted by the Court insofar as direct taxation is concerned should be considered in the 
context of the ongoing discussion since the 1980s over the legitimacy and constitutionality of what 
has been designated as the Court’s judicial activism, or excessive activism.119
                                                 
119 The expression “judicial activism” seems to have been first used by H. Rasmussen, On the Law and Policy in 
the European Court of Justice (Martinus Nijhoff, 1986).  Since then it has been widely used in EU law 
literature, albeit criticised by some, see T. Tridimas, “The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism” (1996) 
European Law Review 21, 199-210. 
  Defined broadly by 
critics as the Court’s tendency to engage in contextual and teleological interpretation and its bias 
Economic growth / Welfare 
Internal Market 
Level playing field / Neutrality 
Non-discrimination / Harmonisation 
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towards European integration, judicial or excessive activism is said to result in, either an assumption 
of competences by the EU vis-à-vis the Member States – so-called “competence creep” – or,120
6.1 Ultra vires action 
 an 
assumption of powers which goes beyond the Court’s judicial function and can be characterised as the 
adoption of a quasi-legislative role.  These two supposed manifestations of the judicial or excessive 
activism phenomenon are interconnected, but they are not identical: the first concerns the question of 
whether the Court’s actions are ultra vires, i.e. whether as an EU institution it has competence to act 
under the Treaties on a specific matter; the second is whether its actions respect the rule of law and 
the principle of separation of powers, i.e. whether the Court, as a judicial body, is usurping powers 
which should instead only be exercised by the EU’s legislative bodies.  Insofar as direct taxation is 
concerned, the Court’s activities and its economic effects, raise questions as regards both these 
aspects. 
Queries must be raised over the consequences of breaking the constitutional instrumental chain in the 
context of the mandate for establishing and improving the functioning of the Internal Market, set out 
in the Treaties, and particularly in Article 26(1) TFEU.  Is it legitimate for the Court to intervene by 
repealing national corporate tax measures, under the constitutional mandate of establishing an EU 
Internal Market, when its decisions in that regard are not actually contributing towards achieving that 
aim?  If the results of the Court’s actions insofar as direct taxation  concerned are not fulfilling the 
Treaties’ aims, then it must be questioned whether the Court is acting ultra vires. 
It results naturally from the principle of conferral of powers set out in the Treaties that, and EU 
institution will act ultra vires where it transgresses the limits of its competence.  That transgression 
may take different forms, including an ultra vires interpretation of Treaty provisions or rules made 
thereunder by the CJEU.121  In fact, the issue of ultra vires action by the Court has been much debated 
and commented upon, particularly in the context of decisions by national constitutional courts 
claiming competence to engage in ultra vires review of CJEU judgments.122
                                                 
120 On “competence creep” see in particular S. Weatherill, “Competence Creep and Competence Control” (2004) 
Yearbook of European Law 25, 1-55; M.A. Pollack, “Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the 
European Community” (1994) Journal of Public Policy 14, 95-145; and A. Prechal, “Competence Creep and 
General Principles of Law” (2010) Review of European Administrative Law 3, 5-22. 
  Whilst revisiting that 
121 See P. Craig, “The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis” (2011) Common Market Law 
Review 48, 395-437, at 395. 
122 See M. Kumm, “Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three Conceptions of the 
Relationship Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice” (1999) 
Common Market Law Review 36, 351; K. Høegh, “The Danish Maastricht Judgment” (1999) European Law 
Review 24(1), 80-90; A. Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, second edition (Oxford, OUP, 
2006), at 255-266; D. Doukas, “The Verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty: 
Not Guilty, but Don’t Do It Again!” (2009) European Law Review 34(6), 866-888; D. Thym, “In the Name of 
Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court” 
(2009) Common Market Law Review 46, 1795-1822; I. Pernice, “Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal: Primacy of 
European Law” in M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), n. (…) above, Part II, Chapter 2, 47-59, at 54-57; 
A. Pliakos and G. Anagnostares, “Who is the Ultimate Arbiter? The Battle Over Judicial Supremacy in EU 
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debate is outside the scope of this paper, it is important to note that there may be different reasons 
why a specific judicial action may be regarded as ultra vires: the claimant may seek to argue that the 
judicial interpretation of the Treaties is too broad, or that the judicial interpretation adopted as regards 
a particular Treaty provision does not pay sufficient attention to internal limits expressed therein.123  
The key difficulty here, however, is of course how to assess whether a specific action falls into these 
categories, what are the criteria to determine whether that action is intra or ultra vires.  Clearly 
determining the scope of intra vires action will always be problematic in a polity such as the EU, 
where the range of powers granted is broad and the language used vague.  Moreover, often the CJEU 
will invoke, either explicitly or implicitly, background normative precepts that shape its vision of 
what it can legitimately do under the Treaty provisions.124
As highlighted above, the powers granted by the Treaty as regards the removal of national 
discriminatory provisions – as well as the approval of harmonising legislation – are instrumental to 
the aim of establishing and improving the functioning of the EU Internal Market; indeed they are 
conditional to attaining that aim.  If the aim is not being achieved and, therefore, the condition is not 
being fulfilled, then it would seem reasonable to conclude that there is a risk that the Court’s actions 
will be regarded as being outside the limits imposed by the Treaties and transgressing the limits to its 
competences imposed therein – ultimately as ultra vires.  Whether such a claim would be successful, 
if even attempted, as regards the Court’s jurisprudence on direct taxation is, of course, impossible to 
predict.  Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the argument has already been presented by national 
governments in cases involving other areas of law.  The CJEU has so far rejected these claims, 
stressing that the interpretation of Treaty provisions in question were within the limits of what was 
absolutely necessary for the attainment of the objectives pursued by the Treaty.
  Alongside the judicial positions adopted 
by the national constitutional courts as regards the scope of the ultra vires review, other criteria have 
also been proposed at the doctrinal level to determine whether such CJEU decisions are within the 
limits imposed by the Treaty.  In this article we present the constitutional instrumental chain as the 
most adequate criterion, at least insofar as direct taxation is concerned: it is argued that the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area should only be regarded as intra vires where it is actually contributing to the 
establishment of an EU Internal Market. 
125
                                                                                                                                                        
Law” (2011) European Law Review 36(1), 109-123; and M. Payadeh, “Constitutional Review of EU Law After 
Honeywell: Contextualizing the Relationship Between the German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of 
Justice” (2011) Common Market Law Review 48, 9-38. 
  Such a conclusion 
may, however, be difficult to sustain insofar as direct taxation is concerned in the face of evidence 
regarding the breaking of the constitutional instrumental chain. 
123 For a full list of potential reasons for an ultra vires claim see P. Craig , n. 121 above, at 397. 
124 P. Craig, n. 121 above, at 407 and 436-437. 
125 See Case C-518/07, European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment of 9 March 2010, nyr, 
known as the Data Protection Supervisory Authorities case, on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data.  See also Case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, Judgment 
of 19 January 2010, nyr, on the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, following on the 
controversial Mangold decision, Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, [2005] ECR I-9981. 
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6.2 Rule of law and separation of powers 
The judicial activism debate has been intensifying over the last three decades, and the literature on the 
topic is now extensive.126
Under Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) the rule of law is one of the founding values 
of the Union.
  Whilst there is no intension of revisiting that debate here, it is important to 
reflect upon the quasi-legislative role adopted by the CJEU insofar as direct taxation is concerned.  In 
particular, it should be considered whether adopting such a role is all the more questionable where the 
ethos underlying it – the aim of furthering European integration and achieving an EU Internal Market 
– is not actually being accomplished through the adoption of that same role. 
127  Whilst some have pointed out the difficulties of reconciling the idea of a state 
governed by the rule of law with a legal framework which does not establish a state per se, it is 
nevertheless accepted that the very foundation of the European project was based on that general 
notion.128  On this basis the CJEU has elaborated significantly on the idea of rule of law, developing it 
as a supra-constitutional principle,129 which arguably prevails even over the “black-letter” of the 
Treaty.130  As acknowledged by the Court, the notion is also inextricably linked to that of separation 
of powers.131  Indeed whilst generally the notion of rule of law carries many of the virtues that a legal 
system may possess,132
                                                 
126 Whilst the arguments put forward by both parties in the discussion will not be analysed here, extensive 
literature is available on the topic.  For a critical view of the Court of Justice see amongst others: H. Rasmussen, 
“Between Self-Restraint and Activism: A Judicial Policy for the European Court” (1988) European Law Review 
13, 28; P. O’Neill, “The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism”, Lords Selected 
Committee on the European Communities, Minutes of Evidence (Session 1994-95, 18th Report, H.L. Paper 88); 
T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Sixth Edition, 
2007), at 74-78.  For a supportive view of the Court of Justice see amongst others: M. Cappelleti, “Is the 
European Court of Justice ‘Running Wild’?” (1987) European Law Review 12, 3; J. Weiler, “The Court of 
Justice on Trial” (1987) Common Market Law Review 24, 555; F. Mancini and Keeling, “Democracy and the 
European Court of Justice” (1994) Modern Law Review 57, 186; A. Arnull, “The European Court and Judicial 
Objectivity: A Reply to Professor Hartley” (1996) Law Quarterly Review 112, 411-423; G. Howe, “Euro-
Justice: Yes or No?” (1996) European Law Review 21(3), 187-198; T. Tridimas, n. (…) above; and W. van 
Gerven, “The Role and Structure of the European Judiciary Now and in the Future” ” (1996) European Law 
Review 21(3), 211-233. 
 and has had many qualities associated with it depending on the particular 
127 Article 2 reads: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights (…)”. The same notion was previously expressed in 
Article 6(1) TEU introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. 
128 O. Zetterquist, “The Judicial Deficit in the EC – Knocking on Heaven’s Door?” in U. Bernitz, J. Nergelius 
and C. Cardner (eds.), n. 96 above, 115-137, at 116 and 122; and L. Pech, “The Rule of Law as a Constitutional 
Principle of the European Union” (2009) Jean Monnet Working Paper Series 04/09. 
129The first time the principle of rule of law was mentioned by the Court was in Les Verts, significantly before 
the principle was set out in the Treaty, see Case 294/83, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament, 
[1986] ECR 1339, at para. 23.  For a complete list of recent cases where the Court invoked rule of law, see L. 
Pech, n. 128 above, at Annex. 
130 O. Zetterquist, n. 128 above, at 122.  As T. Tridimas states: [Article 2] occupies a distinct position in the 
Constitutional Treaty and features at the top tier of the hierarchy of norms of EU law. It thus provides a prime 
point of reference for the interpretation of other provisions of the Constitution” in The General Principles of EU 
Law (Oxford: OUP, 2006), at 16. 
131 See recently Case C-279/09, DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, judgment of 22 December 2010, nyr, paragraph 58. 
132 See J. Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue” in R.L. Cunningham (ed.), Liberty and the Rule of Law (Texas 
A&M University Press, College Station, 1979), 3-31. 
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vision of the concept adopted,133 the principle of separation of powers is certainly amongst these.134  
This principle should in turn be understood as having serious implications for the nature and 
limitations of the judicial role.135  Indeed, it often concerns the boundaries between judicial and 
legislative powers that have traditionally sparked discussions over the relevance and potential 
disrespect for the principle of separation of powers.136  As recognised by the Court, this is equally true 
insofar as the EU legal system is concerned, despite the fact that the EU institutional framework has 
been often characterised as sui generis and not based on a strict separation of powers.137  Early 
references by the Court to this principle can be traced back to the beginnings of the European 
integration process,138 and are today a regular feature within the Court’s rhetoric.  Acknowledgement 
of the limits imposed by it upon the exercise of the Court’s judicial power can equally be found in the 
jurisprudence, with the CJEU stating that it only has jurisdiction to fill a legal vacuum, not to correct 
acts of the legislature,139 that it should exercise restraint in reviewing the legality of legislative acts,140 
or more explicitly that the Court should respect the policy responsibilities which belong to the 
Union’s legislative and administrative organs and, consequently refrain from assuming their role in 
the policy sphere.141
In this context, the quasi-legislative role of the CJEU insofar as direct taxation is concerned would be 
susceptible of being questioned, as possibly overstepping the – admittedly blurry – line that divides 
judicial and legislative powers within the EU.  In fact, whilst analyses of the Court’s role, or even of 
 
                                                 
133 See A.T. Williams, “Promoting Justice After Lisbon: Groundwork for a New Philosophy of EU Law” (2010) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30(4), 663-693, at 667.  For a comprehensive review of the main 
conceptualisations of rule of law proposed by legal theorists, see P. Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions 
of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework” (1997) Public Law, 467-487. 
134 See in particular the work of T.R.S. Allan, namely: T.R.S. Allan, “Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of 
Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism” (1985) Cambridge Law Journal 44(1), 111-143, at 125-129; T.R.S. 
Allan, “The Rule of Law as the Rule of Reason” (1999) Law Quarterly Review 115, 221-244; and T.R.S. Allan, 
“Judicial Deference and Judicial Review: Legal Doctrine and Legal Theory” (2011) Law Quarterly Review 127, 
96-117, at 117.  See also B. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge; CUP, 2004), 
at 37. 
135 See T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford: OUP, 2001), at 
chapters 2 and 5. 
136 As Lord Hoffmann has stated: “It is the power to give decisions which are legislative in character and which 
carry a provisional finality, subject only to amending legislation which is in many cases not a practical 
possibility, which causes the alarm sometimes expressed about encroachment of judicial power”, see “The 
COMBAR Lecture 2001: Separation of Powers” (2002) Judicial Review 7, 137-145, at 138. 
137 See F. Mancini and D. Keeling, n. 126 above, at 181; and J.P. Jacqué, “The Principle of Institutional 
Balance” (2004) Common Market Law Review 41, 383-391, at 388. 
138 See Joined cases 14, 16, 17, 20, 24, 26 and 27/60 and 1/61, Meroni & Co. and others v High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, [1961] ECR 321; and Case 25/70, Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide 
und Futtermittel v Köster and Berodt & Co., [1970] ECR 1161.  Although the Court has often used a different 
terminology, referring to the “principle of institutional balance”, see G. Conway, “Recovering a Separation of 
Powers in the European Union” (2011) European Law Journal 17(3), 304-322, at 319. 
139 Case C-352/09P, ThyssenKrupp Nirosta GmbH, formerly ThyssenKrupp Stainless AG v European 
Commission, Judgment of 29 March 2011, nyr, paragraph 54. 
140 Case C-161/04, Republic of Austria v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, [2006] ECR 
I-7183, Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, paragraph 40. 
141 Case C-317/04, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, [2006] ECR I-4721, Opinion of 
Advocate General Léger, paragraph 233. 
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direct tax matters in general, in the context of the constitutional principles such as rule of law or the 
separation of powers as its corollary are relatively rare,142
 
 accusations that its rulings display a 
disregard for the dividing line between judicial and legislative roles are not infrequent within EU tax 
literature.  These accusations are made even under the assumption that either the Court’s rulings are 
either effective steps towards the achievement of an Internal Market, or that for the Court non-
discrimination is the objective in itself.  They seem much more pertinent, however, in the context of 
an eventual breaking of the constitutional instrumental chain.  Assumption of a quasi-legislative role 
by the Court has essentially been defended on the basis of the nature of the EU legal framework, the 
need to further the European integration process, and the ineffectiveness of the EU legislature to do 
so.  These arguments are hardly applicable where the constitutional mandate is not fulfilled, and in 
face of evidence that, insofar as direct taxation is concerned, the Court’s quasi-legislative role might 
unwillingly have resulted in the fulfilment of the constitutional aim of establishing an EU Internal 
Market being further away today than it had been before its intervention in this process. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have assessed the economic effects of the CJEU direct tax jurisprudence in order to 
determine whether this jurisprudence leads to a more level playing field and increased tax neutrality, 
thus fulfilling the constitutional mandate of establishing an EU Internal Market.  Using the rulings in 
Lankhorst-Hohorst – regarding the compatibility of thin capitalisation rules with free movement 
provisions – and in Marks & Spencer – concerning the compatibility of rules on group consolidation – 
as case studies, we conclude that, depending on the reaction of Member States to the Court’s 
interference, differences in capital costs faced by firms operating in the European Internal Market may 
increase and the level playing field and neutrality may decrease. 
The results presented may appear counter-intuitive for many lawyers – in particular the conclusion 
that, Court-induced uniformisation of tax provisions does not necessary lead to increased neutrality 
and a more level playing field, but may actually steer the EU further away from establishing an 
Internal Market.143
                                                 
142 For a recent study of the exercise of tax powers in the context of constitutional principles, including the rule 
of law, see J. Freedman and J. Vella, ‘HMRC’s Management of the U.K. Tax System: The Boundaries of 
Legitimate Discretion’ in J. Freedman, C. Evans and R. Krever (eds.), The Delicate Balance: Revenue Authority 
Discretions and the Rule of Law, IBFD, (forthcoming 2011).  See also G.T. Loomer, “Taxing Out of Time: 
Parliamentary Supremacy and Retroactive Tax Legislation” (2006) British Tax Review 1, 64-90. 
  In practice the results may be explained in a relatively simple fashion: when only 
one aspect of the tax systems is made uniform – such as thin capitalisation rules, or rules regarding 
group losses – without systematic harmonisation of tax bases or tax rates, these differences at bases 
143 As R. Mason and M.S. Knoll comment “lack of a sophisticated understanding of what competitive neutrality 
requires is problematic (…). Non-economists – including members of the Court of Justice – tend to believe that 
we can understand a tax’s impact on competiveness simply by comparing competitors’ tax rates on a given 
asset. (…) This reasoning is intuitive but wrong”, in n. 80 above. 
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and rates level may became more significant, to the effect that there may be a decrease in neutrality 
and the level playing field.  This possibility arises due to the dynamics of Member States’ reactions to 
the Court’s intervention, whereby some may choose to eliminate non-discrimination through 
extension of tax restrictions to investment.  Such a reaction, whilst probably not the one envisaged by 
the Court, is hardly surprising – in fact a few commentators had already alerted to this potential 
outcome, based on the United States experience.144
The above conclusions do not, of course, take-away from the very real difficulties of dealing with tax 
cases in a manner which respects the constitutional instrumental chain.  Reaching increased neutrality 
and a level playing field through jurisprudential intervention, in the presence of very distinct national 
tax systems and in the absence of harmonising legislation, can hardly be qualified as an easy task – 
and might even be an impossible one.  However, in the face of the economic results presented here, 
one cannot but wonder what has it been all about, i.e. what has been achieved by the last twenty-five 
years of EU tax jurisprudence?  It was obviously impossible to assess within the framework of this 
paper the economic effects of all individual tax decisions made by the CJEU.  It is therefore possible, 
even likely, that many of those decisions will have indeed led to an increased level playing field and 
tax neutrality, thus contributing to the establishing of the EU Internal Market.  However, what has 
been clearly demonstrated, and what must be strongly emphasized, is that this is not always or 
necessarily the result.  It is fundamental therefore to raise awareness, not only of the fact that lack of 
consideration of the constitutional instrumental chain as set out in the Treaties might mean that we are 
heading in the wrong direction but also the potential constitutional consequences of taking that route.  
If effects do not correspond to the Union’s ultimate aim, what is the Court’s legitimacy to act in this 
matter?  There is, in particular, a risk that the Court’s decisions as regards direct taxation may be 
regarded as ultra vires, and/or in violation of the rule of law and its corollary the principle of 
separation of powers. 
  Unfortunately, our empirical analysis of two cases 
studies indicates that, insofar as thin capitalisation rules are concerned, the Court’s intervention has 
indeed resulted in the most negative scenario prevailing; whilst as regards rules on group losses the 
situation is less clear only because most Member States seem to have opted not to alter their tax 
legislation following the Court’s intervention. 
Direct taxation is only one of the many areas, which broadly fall under the so-called “European 
Economic Constitution”, where the CJEU has chosen to intervene intensively through the application 
of the fundamental freedoms.  This raises the further question as to whether the analysis undertaken 
above as regards taxation – namely assessing through economic analysis whether the constitutional 
instrumental chain is being respected – could, and indeed should, be equally applied to those areas.  
                                                 
144 M.J. Graetz and A.C. Warren, Jr., point out that “extending restrictions to intrastate transactions is how US 
states have sometimes responded to adverse US Supreme Court decisions”, see n. 83 above, at 1234. 
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This is a question which we do not propose to answer here, but that we rather leave open to potential 
future investigation. 
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